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ABSTRACT 
The Devil's Blessing:  
Harry Truman and International Control of the Atomic Bomb,  
September 1945- June 1946 
 
Dumlu, Derya 
MA, Department of History 
Supervisor: Assistant Professor Dr. Edward P. Kohn 
June 2007 
 
As the first president who took a step towards nuclear non-proliferation, 
Truman's policy concerning the atomic weapons is worthy of academic scrutiny. This 
work focuses on the ten-month period from September 1945 to June 1946, during 
which American government initiated the international control of the atomic energy. 
Truman's domestic and foreign policy regarding this issue was influenced by several 
external and internal factors, including the supporters and opponents of the 
international control, rise of bipartisanship, the Republican opposition, public 
opinion and the Soviet conduct in different parts of the world. The focus of the thesis 
is President Truman and the shift in the foreign policy. The main argument revolves 
around how the president saw the international control, what factors affected his 
decisions and which actors were involved. From Secretary of War Stimson's proposal 
in September 1945 on approaching the Soviets to the collapse of the negotiations in 
the United Nations Atomic Energy Committee meeting in June 1946, Truman 
pursued policies that were in support of the international control. To come to this 
conclusion, primary documents, such as diaries, memoirs, state papers and 
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newspaper editorial were used as well as the secondary sources following a 
chronological order.  
Key Words: International Control of the Atomic Bomb, Nuclear Weapons, Harry S. 
Truman, Disarmament, Origins of the Cold War. 
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ÖZET 
Şeytanın Lütfu:  
Harry Truman ve Atom Bombasının Uluslararası Denetimi,  
Eylül 1945- Haziran 1946 
 
Dumlu, Derya 
Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yardımcı Doçent Dr. Edward P. Kohn 
Haziran 2007 
 
Bu tez Amerikan hükümetinin Başkan Truman yönetimi altında atom 
bombasının uluslararasını denetimini başlattığı Eylül 1945 ve Haziran 1946 tarihleri 
arasındaki dönemi kapsamaktadır. Uluslararası denetimi destekleyenler ve ona karşı 
çıkanlar, çift partili düşüncenin yükslemesi, Cumhuriyetçi muhalefet, kamuoyu ve 
Sovyet idaresi de dahil olmak üzere bir çok etken bu konuyla ilgili iç ve dış 
poltikaları etkilemiştir. Tezin odak noktası Başkan Truman ve dış politikadaki 
değişimdir. Esas iddia başkanın uluslararası denetimi nasıl gördüğü, kararlarını 
nelerin etkilediği ve hangi etmenlerin yeraldığı konularının etrafında 
yoğunlaşmaktadır. Savaş Sekreteri Stimson’ın Eylül 1945’te yaptığı Sovyetlere 
yakınlaşma teklifinden Haziram 1946’da Birleşmiş Milletler Atom Enerjisi 
Komisyonu toplantısında görüşmelerin sona ermesine kadar Truman uluslararası 
denetimi destekleyen politikalar izledi. Bu sonuca varmak için ikincil kaynakların 
yanısıra günlükler, muhtırlar, devlet kayıtları ve gazeteler gibi birincil kaynaklar da 
zamandizinsel bir düzende kullanılmıştır.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Atom Bombasının Uluslararası Denetimi, Nükleer Silahlar, 
Harry S Truman, Silahsızlanma, Soğuk Savaşın Kökenleri. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The conventional wisdom is: don't make the same 
mistake twice. Learn from your mistakes. [...] Maybe 
we make the mistake three times, but hopefully not 
four or five. There'll be no learning period with 
nuclear weapons. Make one mistake and you're going 
to destroy nations. 
─ Robert S. McNamara 
 
 
 
Harry S. Truman became the president of the United States of America late in 
the afternoon on April 12, 1945. The death of Franklin Delano Roosevelt left Truman 
in charge of an unfinished war and the Manhattan Project, one of the biggest military 
projects in American history. Even though Truman, as senator and the chairman of 
the Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, had attempted to inspect 
the nature of this project which demanded millions of dollars, Truman later withdrew 
his demand for an investigation after being assured of the project’s importance and 
secrecy by Secretary of War Henry Lewis Stimson. In a very short time after 
becoming president, indeed, the very day after, James Byrnes, the former director of 
war mobilization, informed Truman about the development of a new destructive 
weapon, the atomic bomb. When Stimson talked to Truman on April 25, the course 
of the conversation was markedly different than those they had previously 
exchanged. Stimson said, “[w]ithin four months we shall in all probability have 
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completed the most terrible weapon ever known to human history, one bomb of 
which could destroy a whole city.”1 This was three months before the first 
detonations of an atomic bomb.  
The bomb had primarily been developed in response to the threat posed by 
Nazi Germany and the war in Europe, which raged during the years of Roosevelt’s 
presidency. Roosevelt, the architect of the project, apparently never expressed doubt 
or hesitations regarding the usage of the bomb, as Stimson notes: “at no time, from 
1941 to 1945, did I ever hear it suggested by the President, or by any other 
responsible member of the government, that atomic energy should not be used in 
war.”2 By the time the bomb had been completed, however, the situation had 
changed dramatically. The war in Europe had come to a halt and Roosevelt had died 
before ever learning of the success of his two-billion dollar project. The Pacific War 
was still at hand, however, and the decision of whether or not to use the bomb in the 
war was left to Truman. The weight and responsibility of such a decision was 
reflected in the statements made by those who tested the bomb in Alamogordo, New 
Mexico on July 15, 1945. They, too acknowledged its deadly power. J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, for example, a theoretical physicist and the scientific director of the 
Manhattan Project, later recalled that testing day: “I remembered the line from the 
Hindu scripture, the Bhagavad-Gita. Vishnu is trying to persuade the Prince that he 
should do his duty and to impress him takes on his multi-armed form and says, 'Now, 
I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds.' I suppose we all thought that one way 
                                               
1
 Henry Stimson, “Memorandum discussed with the President, April 25, 1945, Stimson Diary”, Yale 
University Archives, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/3b.pdf. 
2
 Henry L. Stimson, quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold war, 
1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 245. 
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or another."3 For Truman, however, there was even more to consider than the bomb’s 
capacity to kill. 
Before any decision was made about using the bomb, Truman and other 
statesmen had to determine whether or not the Russians should be informed about it, 
a deliberation which drew heated debates. Secretary of War Stimson delivered the 
opinion of the conclusion of the American officials. As a result, at the Potsdam 
Conference in July Truman casually told Joseph Stalin about the invention of a new 
powerful bomb without going into any further details. In return, Stalin casually 
expressed the hope that it would be used against the Japanese as the Pacific War as 
the only front remaining in World War II. Truman shared the same mentality with 
Roosevelt and Churchill that this new device was simply a weapon: “I regarded the 
bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt that it should be used.”4 On 
August 6, 1945, “Little Boy” was detonated over Hiroshima and three days later “Fat 
Man” over Nagasaki. On August 15, Japan announced its unconditional surrender to 
the Allied Powers. World War II had ended.  
The debates over why Truman dropped the bomb have been going on since 
August of 1945. There are many arguments on the subject coming from different 
schools of thought. In The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb Gar Alperovitz argued 
that the bomb was dropped for political, rather than military, reasons and thus was 
not necessary to end the war with Japan. He contended that the bomb was dropped as 
a message to the Russians, not to end the war in the Pacific. On the other hand, some 
historians, like John Lewis Gaddis, in the book The United States and the Origins of 
the Cold War, 1941-1947, argue that the atomic bomb was used in accordance with 
                                               
3
 J. Robert Oppenheimer on the day of Trinity Test, quoted in Ronald Takaki, Hiroshima (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 15. 
4
 Harry S Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Years of Decision, (New York: Doubleday & 
Company, Inc. 1955) 
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why it was invented, that is as a weapon. Furthermore, the rationale for why the 
bomb was detonated in Japan informs scholars about the way Truman saw the war, 
the Japanese, and the Russians. He is thus often labeled with the stereotype of being 
a militaristic president, a Cold Warrior, and a supporter of the arms race. However, 
in the midst of such arguments and stereotypes, there is a short period of time which, 
when analyzed, seems to challenge and, indeed, break such characterizations of 
Truman; it is this period which will be the focus of this study. 
In 1945, there was not a Cold War, or a nuclear arms race. Even though 
Truman is presented as a Cold Warrior by the historians and is seen as a strong 
defender of the nuclear arms race, the months before the declaration of the Truman 
doctrine reveal that Truman was seeking a way to provide an international forum for 
the control of the atomic bomb. Truman and other American officials were well 
aware of the implications of the bomb’s usage in the post-war world and became 
concerned immediately after the Japanese surrender. The reality of the atomic bomb 
was not a light burden to carry. The end of the war left the United States of America 
with unheard-of military power. The politicians, the scientists, the soldiers and the 
President were all looking into the future world with an awareness of the atomic 
bomb and its potential ramifications. The months between September 1945 and June 
1946 is a period when Truman searched for both domestic and international support 
for his initiative concerning the international control of the atomic bomb. In 
September 1945, Secretary of War Stimson suggested that the United States would 
initiate talks leading to the international control of atomic weapons. The proposal 
was embraced by Truman and the following months witnessed a multitude of 
discussions, efforts at opposition, offers of support and various other plans 
concerning this issue. However, in June 1946, the attempts failed when, during the 
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meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, the United States and 
the Soviet Union could not agree on the method of international control during. 
In the historiography of the origins of the Cold War, there appears to be three 
main interpretations. The first one is defined as the traditionalist or orthodox 
approach. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Herbert Feis, and Louis J. Halle can be counted 
among the traditionalist historians. The main arguments of traditionalism are: Stalin's 
aggressive and expansionist actions cause the Cold War, until 1947 American 
foreign policy was passive and defensive, the United States did not pursue its own 
interest and after World War II America embraced universalism and rejected the 
concept of sphere of influence.5  
By the end of the 1950s, the antithesis of the traditionalist approach came 
with William Appleman Williams. Williams argued that Open Door policy the 
United States pursued created the basis for the American empire. Following 
Williams' work, many revisionist works appeared especially after the Vietnam War 
and American actions in the Caribbean. Gar Alperovitz, Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, 
Lloyd Gardner, Walter LaFeber and Barton Bernstein can be counted among the 
revisionist scholars. The revisionists argued that the Truman administration dropped 
the atomic bombs not only to end the war with Japan but also to give a warning to 
the Soviet Union about their ambitions in the Far East and in the Eastern Europe. 
Then, in the early years of the Cold War, America created a rhetoric of “winning 
weapon” to intimidate the Russians. The Revisionists also argued that the atomic 
diplomacy increased the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
Thus, the main arguments of the revisionist approach are: Soviet Union was not the 
                                               
5
 Edward Crapol, “Some Reflections on the Historiography of the Cold War,” The History Teacher, 
Vol. 20, No. 2. (Feb., 1987): 251-262. 
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only culprit of the Cold War, America had its own economic and politic agenda, and 
therefore America did not pursue a passive and innocent foreign policy.6  
In the last decade, the new synthesis for the historiography of the origins of 
the Cold War took the name of postrevisionism, or neo-orthodoxy or eclecticism. 
Johns Lewis Gaddis and George Herring gave eclectic interpretations of this period. 
Like revisionists, postrevisionists also out emphasis in economic factors and 
American expansionism. Postrevisionists argued that the United States used 
economics for its political goals, Stalin was an opportunist, United States at times 
exaggerated the external danger and there exists and American empire.7 In this 
spectrum of interpretation, the current work would fall into a category between 
revisionism and postrevisionism. It is revisionist since it attempts to explain that the 
post-war environment was created both by Americans and the Soviets. Thus, Soviets 
were not the only responsible party. It is postrevisionist, since there is more emphasis 
put on the individuals and less on the economics. Therefore, this study should be 
read keeping this framework in mind. 
The period from September 1945 to June 1946 thus occupies a unique place 
in the history of the post-war world since these months witnessed the ambiguity of 
the international atmosphere, foreshadowed the Cold War and encompassed the 
efforts for the international control of the atomic bomb. However, the rise of the 
Cold War after the war dominates the history of the time between the dropping of the 
atomic bomb in August 1945 and the Truman Doctrine in March 1947. This poses 
several problems to the study of this period. First of all, historians tend to 
overemphasize the legacy of Franklin D. Roosevelt in the Truman administration, 
thus minimizing the uniqueness of the actors and the events of this period. Secondly, 
                                               
6
 Ibid.  
7
 Ibid. 
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the assumption that the origins of the Cold War go back to the World War I makes 
historians see this period merely as a piece of a single anti-communist phenomenon. 
Thirdly, the examination of the person of Truman as an unchanging and, usually, 
stubborn character without giving him the space to react to other persons and 
incidents is also an obstacle to the analysis of this ten-month period. Lastly, hindsight 
of the Cold War is also a problematic feature, which encourages the historian to 
interpret every event as a sign leading inevitably to the arms race and nuclear 
deterrence. Keeping these biases in mind, there are several books and articles 
contributing to the historiography of this ten-month period from 1945 to 1946. It 
should be noted, however, that none of the sources deal exclusively with the issue 
but are rather works which touch on the period at hand. 
Doubtlessly, John Lewis Gaddis is one of the most important contributors to 
the historiography of the Cold War. His book, The United States and the Origins of 
the Cold War, is a definitive work on the subject. Gaddis mostly focuses on the 
internal affairs and domestic opinion in relation to the foreign policy. His main 
argument is that the American policy makers were bound by domestic politics more 
so than their Russian counterparts. Therefore, Gaddis tends to put the blame on the 
shoulders of Russia and Stalin. Even though his work is crucial, his bias as a strong 
anti-revisionist should be taken into account. Nevertheless, in spite of this, Gaddis 
offers one of the best-researched and well-written pieces concerning the international 
control of atomic energy, concluding that American foreign policy moved away from 
atomic diplomacy in 1946. Another book by Gaddis The Long Peace, a collection of 
essays previously published or presented by the author, focuses on how the USA and 
the USSR managed to achieve a long peace, i.e., an absence of war, during what is 
called the Cold War. Gaddis’s argument is crucial for this thesis in that he argues that 
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the leaders of both countries were extremely reluctant to use the bomb as a threat or 
as a weapon. Gaddis claims that, although it was suggested on five different 
occasions, Truman never considered using the weapon after 1945. Furthermore, 
Gaddis scrutinizes the atmosphere, which naturally impacted the view of the policy 
makers, within the United States and in Europe. In his latest book We Now Know, 
Gaddis looks at the Cold War from a post-Cold War perspective and analyzes the 
policies claiming the privilege of hindsight. Not surprisingly, he devotes a chapter to 
nuclear weapons, which, taking an unusual approach, addresses why the United 
States did not intend to start a preventative war while it had a monopoly over nuclear 
weapons. Even without taking into account his important remarks on the 
international control of the atomic bomb during the presidency of Truman, Gaddis’s 
stance is worthy of consideration, especially after the opening of the Russian 
archives.  
Andrew Fontaine’s History of the Cold War: From the October Revolution to 
the Korean War, 1917-1950 is a very short book which, nevertheless, makes a 
relevant point which demands attention. Fontaine focuses on the argument that 
Truman never intended to use the bomb as a diplomatic tool against the Soviets; 
however, the bomb gave him ground to maneuver his policies if the Soviet side 
became tough. The first part of the thesis reveals in part Truman’s perception of the 
bomb and its limitations.  
Yet another notable source, written by diplomatic historian Michael J. Hogan, 
examines the developments within the state during the first decade of the Cold War 
in his book A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National 
Security State, 1945-1954. He presents a valuable history of the national security 
state, thereby providing a more accurate perspective about the policies that followed. 
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Though the period focused on in this thesis is covered in the book, Hogan devotes 
only about ten pages to the international control of the atomic bomb as the bulk of 
the book is devoted to the Cold War development. Still, Hogan’s diplomatic history 
is helpful in that it gives an account of the dealings between the Republicans and the 
Democrats and between the civil and military authorities at this time.  
Gregg Herken, likewise, is a historian who focused on this period with his 
book, The Winning Weapon: the Atomic Bomb in the Cold War. In this work, the 
four-year journey of the bomb, from the fall of 1945, right after Hiroshima, until the 
detonation of the hydrogen bomb in Russia in 1949 and its aftermath during 1950, 
was considered, with an emphasis on the first years of the weapon. He mainly argues 
that Truman’s efforts to turn the control of the bomb over to the civilians were 
defeated by the apparent victory of the McMahon Act8. Although he states that the 
group of policy-makers believed in sharing the scientific knowledge with the Soviets, 
Herken also makes a point that the Baruch Plan ended all hope for serious 
international control of the bomb by offering an unacceptable prospect. Finally, 
Herken concludes that the Truman administration justified the status quo, i.e. the 
monopoly of the bomb in the hands of the United States, with the collapse of the 
negotiations in the IAEA meeting in 1946. Specter of Communism by Melvyn P. 
Leffler is a short account of the origins of the Cold War, dating from 1917 to 1953. 
The way the author roots the Cold War in the first half of the twentieth century is 
important as a counter argument for the current study, since the author claims that 
Truman possessed a Cold War mentality before 1946. However, even though the 
                                               
8
 McMahon Act, formally Atomic Energy Act of 1946, determined how the nuclear energy and 
technology would be used and directed in the United States. Most importantly, the act established that 
nuclear weapons and energy would be controlled by the civilian authorities rather than military. The 
act, which was sponsored by Senator Brien McMahon, was signed by President Truman in August 
1946, and went into effect in January 1947. For further information see S. J. Ball, “Military Nuclear 
Relations between the United States and the Great Britain under the Terms of the McMahon Act, 
1946-1958, The Historical Journal Vol. 38, No. 2. (Jun., 1995): 439-454.  
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arguments will be considered as reference points, it should be kept in mind that this 
book lacks a wide range of primary sources. Joseph I. Lieberman's book, The 
Scorpion and Tarantula: The Struggle to Control Atomic Weapons 1945-1949, 
provides quotations from many important figures of the time. Even though the 
analytical work and the perspective of this book is not satisfactory for use as a 
supportive scholarly work, the book is an extensive presentation of archival research.  
The biographies of important figures are also significant secondary sources 
for the study at hand as through them one can see the importance of prominent actors 
and also grasp the environment they were in and the paths they followed. Dean 
Acheson was one of the key actors of this period. David S. McLellan’s book Dean 
Acheson: the State Department Years contains a separate chapter on Dean Acheson’s 
years as the undersecretary of state from 1945 to 1947. McLellan talks about how 
Acheson was involved in the formation of the domestic control of the bomb and how 
he was in favor of a rapprochement in relations with the USSR. The chapter devoted 
to this period of Acheson’s career is one of the most detailed histories of the 
development of this period including the context of public opinion and the 
developments in the Congress and the Senate.  
David E. Lilienthal was one of the members of the committee formed to 
frame a plan for the international control of the atomic bomb. Steven M. Neuse’s 
book David E. Lilienthal: the Journey of an American Liberal is a biography which, 
although it does not contain much about the period leading to Acheson-Lilienthal 
plan, is a well-written overview. Another available source is related to one of the 
most important figures of the Manhattan Project and the Atomic Energy 
Commission, James B. Conant. James G. Hershberg supplies the perspective of this 
important figure and also provides a detailed account of the development of this ten 
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month period in James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the 
Nuclear Age. 
The biographies of Truman himself do not address this specific time period of 
his presidency. William E. Pemberton’s Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer and Cold 
Warrior devoted fewer than twenty pages to the international control of the bomb 
after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, though the book did give the reader valuable insight 
about Truman’s dilemma between domestic and foreign policy. Other biographies 
like The Man from Missouri by Alfred Steinberg, Mr. President: Truman by William 
Hillman, and Harry S. Truman: a Life by Robert H. Ferrell include virtually nothing 
about the subject matter. Other biographical works including Plain Speaking, an 
Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman by Merle Miller, Truman in Retirement: A 
Former President Views the Nation and the World by Gregory W. Sand, The Truman 
Presidency by Cabell Phillips and Harry S. Truman by Margaret Truman provide 
biased accounts since they tend to justify the works of Truman because of their 
kinship with him. However, these biases can illuminate the personal and emotional 
aspects of the president if the historian is able to see through the subjectivity. On the 
other hand, Truman written by David McCullough outlines the situation the thirty-
third president was in after the end of the World War II by describing where Truman 
stood as a president who was trapped in the midst of post-war domestic affairs and 
the advent of a new super power. Although McCullough’s account of this ten-month 
period occupies but a few pages in his book, he succeeds in portraying the 
limitations, hesitations and visions of Truman. Another book on Truman presidency 
covering this period is Robert J. Donovan’s Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of 
Harry S. Truman. Even though Donovan uses historical research methods and 
primary documents, his profession as a journalist is reflected in the methodology 
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employed in the writing of this book. The drawbacks of the scholarship, however, are 
not significant enough to destroy the potential of the book as a secondary source. 
Therefore, because Donovan examines only a short period of Truman’s presidency, 
he inevitably discusses the developments of late 1945 and early 1946. He devotes 
two chapters to issues such as Truman’s view of Russians, the development leading 
to Baruch Plan and the plan itself. Yet, the work is not to be relied on too heavily 
because of the lack of scholarly credibility of the author.  
There are also some articles written regarding various aspects of the issue 
which are worthy of mention in the historiography. To begin with, “The Quest for 
Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 
1942-1946” by Barton J. Bernstein offers a well-written overview of the events 
during these years, emphasizing the international control efforts during the Truman 
administration. Bernstein, in his conclusion, takes a position in the middle by 
claiming that the failure of the negotiations showed mutual mistrust. Secondly, 
“Anglo-American Diplomacy and the Introduction of the Atomic Energy in the 
United Nations: Discord and Cooperation in 1945” by Dimitris Bourantonis and 
Edward Johnson scrutinizes the approaches of the Truman and Attlee governments, 
focusing mainly on the meeting of three leaders in late 1945 and arguing that both 
governments supported international control under the United Nations. Thirdly, 
Henry B. Ryan’s article titled “A New Look at Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ Speech” is 
relevant because of its examination of the background, perspectives and conclusions 
related to this significant document of the early Cold War years. Lastly, “The 
American Conception of National Security and the Beginning of the Cold War, 
1945-1948” by Melvyn P. Leffler covers how the politicians and the policy makers 
saw national security in the post-war setting of Europe and the world. The article 
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points out the several different aspects of concern for the government at this time 
such as overseas bases and budgetary issues.  
Along with the secondary sources, this study will rely on primary documents 
including diaries, memoirs, state papers and newspaper editorials. The memoirs of 
Harry S. Truman, Dean Acheson, James F. Byrnes, David E. Lilienthal, Henry 
Wallace and Arthur Vandenberg offer the insider’s perspective on how important 
actors of the time perceived the potentials of the atomic bomb. However, the fact that 
the memoirs were written with the hindsight should be kept in mind. The letters and 
diary entries of J. Robert Oppenheimer shed light on how the scientist himself was 
affected by Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings and how his view changed in the 
post-war period. Other declassified documents like memoranda of conversations 
between decision-makers, meetings and files reveal the primary concerns, aims and 
perspectives of American officials. Furthermore, newspaper editorials from The New 
York Times and The Chicago Tribune reflect the view of two influential newspapers 
of the time. These two newspapers were chosen to reflect positions of two opposing 
camps concerning the international control. The former paper was more supportive 
of the international control and collaboration with other countries. The latter was 
more isolationist and encouraging of preserving American nuclear monopoly. 
Considering that this time period has not been studied in depth by historians, the 
primary documents will occupy a significant part of the current study.  
During the analysis of this period, in chapter two, I will discuss how the 
matter of international control of the atomic bomb came into being. This section will 
deal with the perspectives of the different actors involved in both decision-making 
and opinion forming, and also what initial steps were taken by the Truman 
administration. In the third chapter, the rise of opposition and the changing dynamics 
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in domestic and foreign policy will be put forward in an attempt to point out the 
change of direction in the policy making process. Lastly, the fourth chapter deals 
with the appointment of Baruch, the ramifications of this appointment and the United 
Nations Atomic Energy Commission meeting in June. In the fifth chapter, I will 
conclude the thesis with a review of what followed the collapse of the talks in the 
summer of 1946, a look at the importance and ramifications of this study and a 
discussion of the situation of nuclear disarmament today.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
“THE COMMON INTEREST OF ALL” 
 
We knew the world would not be the same. 
─ J. Robert Oppenheimer 
 
 
 
Having a nuclear monopoly following the development of the atomic bomb, 
the United States was confronted with one of the biggest dilemmas in its history. 
There were many voices with clashing opinions entering into the debate over how to 
handle this newfound power. On the one side the politicians wanted to use the atomic 
bomb as the ultimate weapon and a means by which to create the world America 
wanted. The words of Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado reveal the extremity of 
some opinions in this camp: “God almighty in His infinite wisdom [has] dropped the 
atomic bomb in our lap,… with vision and guts and plenty of atomic bombs…. [we 
could] compel mankind to adopt the policy of lasting peace… or be burned to a 
crisp.”9 On the other side, there were several different figures from politicians, 
statesmen and scientists who were aware of the power of the atomic bomb and saw 
the danger it could pose in the future. These two different camps of opinion 
determined the shaping of American domestic and foreign policy for the months 
ahead.  
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The American public as a whole actually knew very little about the bomb. 
The secrecy of the Manhattan Project and the scientific complexity of nuclear 
physics made it almost impossible to create a solid and sane public opinion on the 
issue. Other than the knowledge of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, even most of the 
politicians did not understand the strength and the implications of the atomic bomb. 
Thus, in September of 1945, the Truman administration sought to create a domestic 
and foreign policy concerning the atomic bomb in an atmosphere of ignorance, 
extremity and uncertainty. This quest, which began in August of 1945, reached a 
turning point in November 1945 with the Truman-Attlee-King declaration, the first 
step towards the international control of the atomic bomb in the post-war era. The 
developments over these four months demonstrate that even though Truman was 
under domestic pressure, he was willing to create an international platform for 
control of atomic weapons. He started the process by accepting a proposal to 
establish civilian domestic and international control of the bomb in September. The 
attempts eventually led to the Truman-Attlee-King Agreement in November 1945. 
This chapter will deal with the developments of this time period both inside and 
outside of the United States. 
One important consideration in taking up the internal atmosphere and 
developments in the United States at the time is the perspectives of the various 
actors, including statesmen, scientists and military figures, who either endorsed or 
opposed international control. The statesmen of the Truman administration stood in 
different places in terms of their proximity to the bomb debate. Secretary of War 
Henry Lewis Stimson was one the men closest to the issue. Stimson was an 
experienced statesman, who was involved in the government during the presidencies 
of William H. Taft, Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover, Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
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finally Harry Truman. President Roosevelt appointed him as the supervisor of the 
Manhattan Project, which made him one of the most knowledgeable politicians on 
the development and usage of the atomic bomb. Stimson did not see the bomb purely 
as a military asset, but also considered the responsibility of possessing such an 
immense power: “development of this weapon has placed a certain moral 
responsibility upon us which we cannot shirk.”10 In general, Stimson was in line with 
the perspective of the scientists in that he endorsed the international control of the 
atomic bomb. However, he was also aware of the political atmosphere in the Soviet 
Union, which concerned him regarding the efficacy of any international control. It 
might become impossible to influence the developments inside Russia considering 
the totalitarian nature of the government. However, he believed that the instability of 
Russia should not become an excuse to prolong the American monopoly, but should 
only function as a condition that requires precaution. In the end, Stimson concluded 
that the atomic bomb should be controlled internationally despite the uncertain 
position of the Soviet Union.11 
Stimson, as Secretary of War, was able to see the current international 
situation and the role of the atomic bomb quite differently from his colleagues. He 
concluded that the struggle to sustain the nuclear monopoly would become the very 
thing that would lead to an arms race, since “any demand by us for an internal 
change in Russia as a condition of sharing in the atomic weapon would be so 
resented that it would make the objective we have in view less probable.”12 It was 
possible that an initiative coming from the United States would cause acceleration in 
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developing the bomb in Russia. But, Stimson argued that withholding from such an 
action might instigate “a secret armament race of a rather desperate character.” The 
risk needed to be taken because “if we fail to approach them now and merely 
continue to negotiate with them, having this weapon rather ostentatiously on our hip, 
their suspicions and their mistrust of our purposes and motives will increase.”13 As a 
result, the Secretary of War proposed that the United States, Great Britain and 
Canada would approach the Soviet Union to mutually stop further bomb 
construction. Existing weapons would be confiscated, and an international agreement 
would be obtained forbidding the use of atomic energy for military purposes.14 This 
suggestion resulted in clashes, long meetings and negotiations.  
Stimson’s proposal created different reactions from the members of the 
government, but most harbored significant concerns regarding the sharing of such 
information. The Secretary of the Navy of the Truman Administration, James 
Vincent Forrestal, had reservations concerning the international control of the atomic 
bomb because of his mistrust of the Russians. He stated,  
Until we are very sure that it is the sense of the people to make 
disposition of this knowledge even to our Allies it seems to me that it 
is a step that should be considered most carefully and taken only after 
complete study and reflection so that the charge may never be leveled 
that it was done on impulse.15  
 
Forrestal favored the idea that the United Nations would appoint the United 
States as the “trustee of all information regarding the atomic bomb.”16 Only under 
these circumstances, according to Forrestal, could the United States agree to use the 
atomic bomb in line with the directions of the international organization. The 
Secretary of the Navy was not alone in this line of thought; the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
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were also reluctant to approve an information exchange. While they agreed that the 
general scientific knowledge of building the bomb was widely known, the know-how 
of how to actually build it was still a secret the United States possessed. They saw an 
armament race as inevitable and sharing any knowledge with the Russians would 
only hasten the process. The skepticism towards Russia was a pattern among the 
military staff. The Chief of Staff to the president, Admiral William D. Leahy, was 
also against sharing any information regarding the building of the bomb and was 
strongly in favor of continuing the American nuclear monopoly as long as possible. 
17
 The political and military front of the top men of the administration did not look 
on Stimson’s proposal with favor because of the way the Soviet Union acted during 
and after World War II. Their cynicism regarding what the Soviet Union might do 
with such a powerful weapon overrode fears of the possibility of a future arms race 
or a war including nuclear weapons.  
On the other end of the equilibrium, and more closely aligned with 
Stimson’s view, were the non-political actors. The scientists, the brains behind the 
atomic bomb, were strongly in support of international control and, after Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, they tried to shift both public opinion and foreign policy in this 
direction. J. Robert Oppenheimer, who was the scientific director of the Manhattan 
Project, was doubtlessly the most influential of the nuclear scientists in the political 
and scientific arena. Oppenheimer delivered a speech in November 1945 at the 
Association of Los Alamos Scientists. Some five hundred distinguished scientists 
and physicists went to listen to Oppenheimer's speech, a speech which the majority, 
when asked, claim to have remembered years later. Oppenheimer first criticized the 
secrecy and control under which the scientific research was conducted, arguing that it 
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was against the very nature of science, which aims for the good of all and shares 
knowledge with whoever is interested in both scientific and material exchanges. 
Then he compared the atomic weapons to the Nazis, asserting that both should be 
dealt with within a community of responsibility: 
If you approach the problem and say “We know what is right and we 
would like to use the atomic bomb to persuade you to agree with us,” 
then you are in a very weak position and you will not succeed, 
because under those conditions you will not succeed in delegating 
responsibility for the survival of men. It is a purely unilateral 
statement; you will find yourselves attempting by force of arms to 
prevent a disaster.18 
 
Furthermore, he favored the multilateral action of the world governments, 
instead of a unilateral action by the United States, and the establishment of an atomic 
energy commission. At the end, Oppenheimer encouraged his fellow scientists to 
stick to the truth unconditionally, preserve the fraternity of scientists and not to 
forget that they were all, first and foremost, men.19 Oppenheimer's speech was, to a 
great extent, an expression of how the scientists viewed the atomic bomb and its 
future. His opinions were very influential because he was the leading scientist of the 
Manhattan Project and therefore one of the men who was responsible for the creation 
of the bomb itself.  
However, Oppenheimer20 was not the only one who raised his voice against 
the monopoly of the atomic bomb. Niels Bohr, a Danish physicist who specialized in 
atom and quantum physics, stated that technology had reached such a level as to 
remove any room for defense. Therefore, as early as August 1945, Bohr defended 
international control that would be effective only with “free access to all scientific 
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information and the granting of the opportunity of international supervision.”21 
Moreover, many scientists not only favored international control but, taking it a step 
further, spoke against the bomb itself. In a book titled One World or None, the 
prominent scientists of the time combined their articles on different aspects of the 
atomic bomb and made a case against the bomb and its usage. In this book, Philip 
Morrison, the astrophysicist of the Manhattan Project, backed up Bohr’s argument by 
painting a picture of the death and destruction that had occurred in Hiroshima. Leo 
Szilard22, the physicist who conceived of the nuclear chain reaction, considered 
whether it was possible to prevent an arms race by an inspection system, concluding 
that, with international collaboration, this was a feasible solution: “if the United 
States, Russia, and other nations actually set up such an arrangement, an atomic arms 
race could be postponed and probably averted.”23  
Oppenheimer and Alberts Einstein, two of the well-known scientists of the 
time, joined their colleagues in making a public statement against the bomb. In the 
book mentioned above, Oppenheimer defended a collective effort towards the 
elimination of all atomic weapons and argued that the danger of this new weaponry 
stood above any kind of benefits its possession may provide: “the common interest of 
all in the prevention of atomic warfare would seem immensely to overshadow any 
purely national interest, whether of welfare or of security.”24 Albert Einstein25 
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asserted that the only way to escape a devastating war was for individual 
governments to operate under international jurisdiction, by which they would be 
prevented from declaring war by a supranational organization. These premises 
should take place, according to Einstein, so that we can “have some assurance that 
we shall not vanish into the atmosphere, dissolved into atoms, one of these days.”26 
Therefore, the stance of the prominent scientists was unanimously in favor of 
international control. They tried to publicize their opinions as much as possible to 
encourage a similar public opinion on the issue thereby putting pressure on the 
government to take the necessary steps towards a solution.  
As mentioned above, the military figures that were close to the foreign 
policy-making structure were reluctant to support international control. The War 
Department director of the Manhattan Project, Major General Leslie R. Groves was 
one of the strongest figures on the opposing front. He did not support any form of 
exchange of information with the Soviet Union. Groves advised that United States 
should maintain its superiority “until all of the other nations of the world are as 
anxious for peace as we are. And by ‘anxious for peace,’ I mean in the heart and not 
by speech or signature in a treaty which they do not intend to honor.”27 Groves 
expressed his opinion to the president, taking a stance in accordance with that of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and seeing the atomic bomb as weapon that made the world 
more secure for the United States and other nations in the presence of unpredictable 
governments. 
Groves was not alone in his skepticism. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, 
who was one of the most influential political figures of the 1940s in America, joined 
Groves in his reluctance to share information and control. Byrnes served in all three 
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branches of the government as a senator, governor, Supreme Court justice and, 
finally, as the secretary of state between 1945 and 1947. For Byrnes, the atomic 
weapon was a device to make the Russians easier to deal with. Even though he 
agreed with the scientists that other nations would develop their own atomic weapons 
eventually, Byrnes did not think that it was wise to hasten this process with an 
information exchange: “I felt that if any nation were opposed to submitting atomic 
energy to complete control by an international organization, with safeguards against 
violations, then the longer we could keep the bomb out of the hands of that nation, 
the better it would be for the people of the world.”28 For Byrnes, the scientists did not 
possess the knowledge to make comments on how to use the bomb. The politics of 
the bomb was to be left to the government, which should not hasten to take any 
definitive measure concerning the control of the atomic bomb, the weapon which 
could be used to shape the United States foreign policy in the near future.29  
However the opinions of the Secretary of State were not even endorsed by 
some members of his own department, starting with his Undersecretary Dean G. 
Acheson. Acheson, who played a key role in defining American Cold War foreign 
policy in later years, was appointed as the Undersecretary of State by President 
Truman in 1945. Since his chief Byrnes was out of Washington most of the time, 
Acheson found himself as the acting Secretary of State quite often. This gave more 
power to Acheson than his predecessors and, thus, he became one of the most 
important figures of the foreign policy-making process during his service. 
Furthermore, he was the middleman between Truman and Byrnes, influencing both 
on many issues including the international control of atomic weapons. Acheson 
endorsed and emphasized the scientists’ conclusion that the scientific facts of nuclear 
                                               
28
 James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1947), 265. 
29
 Harry S Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Years of Decision (New York: Doubleday & 
Company, Inc. 1955), 87. 
24 
 
physics should not be, and indeed were not, under American monopoly. There was 
no doubt that the Russians were working on the development of nuclear weapons. 
Furthermore, the Undersecretary of State noted that any effort to exclude the 
Russians would result in insecurity and enmity:  
The Joint development of this discovery with the U.K. and Canada 
must appear to the Soviet Union to be unanswerable evidence of an 
Anglo-American combination against them… It is impossible that a 
government as powerful and power conscious as the Soviet 
Government could fail to react vigorously to this situation. It must and 
will exert every energy to restore the loss of power which this 
situation has produced.30 
 
Besides individuals of the political, scientific and military world, opinions 
regarding the future of the weapon also appeared in the media and the public realm. 
Two prominent newspapers of that time, The New York Times and Chicago Daily 
Tribune, reflected the views of two different perspectives of the people who were 
knowledgeable enough about the bomb to offer such opinions. The former paper took 
a more liberal stance by supporting the international control of the atomic bomb, and 
thereby aligning with the scientists and the statesmen who favored negotiations with 
other countries. However, the latter was more conservative and isolationist, 
approving of the American nuclear monopoly and siding with those who were not 
willing to negotiate with the Soviets. The New York Times published information 
about nuclear energy and radioactive elements to enlighten the public as early as 
September 1945. The dangers of owning a nuclear arsenal and the possibility that 
any willing nation might obtain one were some of the concerns of the editors of The 
New York Times. Regarding these issues, they were unwilling to put the 
responsibility on the shoulders of either the politicians or the scientists alone, but 
rather encouraged a joint effort between the two:  
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The world has been enriched with a discovery and an invention which 
should be hailed as the dawn of a new era, yet, for the moment, we 
can think chiefly of death and destruction. The only crumb of comfort 
that can be extracted from the situation in which we find ourselves is 
the growing realization that this world cannot risk a global war waged 
with atomic explosives.31  
 
As a result, by depicting the destructive power of the weapon and the 
dangers of its existence no matter which country owns it, The New York Times took 
its place among the supporters of global control of some sort both within and outside 
the country.  
The Chicago Daily Tribune, on the other hand, sanctioned a somewhat 
different approach to the debate on the future atomic policy. While The Chicago 
Daily Tribune also recognized that it was impossible to hold the basic scientific 
knowledge back and while the editors of the paper were open to the idea of scientific 
exchange as long as the secrets of engineering and the industry were not revealed, 
their support of such an international forum for control was not nearly as 
enthusiastic. Thus, although it seemed like the paper backed international 
collaboration, their distrust of Russia appeared so strong that the very existence of 
Russians in this exchange would paralyze the future plans for the bomb. As a result 
of said distrust, The Chicago Daily Tribune was quite reluctant to support this 
prospect fully: “We can be reasonably certain, that the Russians will grasp anything 
we offer but will hide anything of significance that their own scientists may discover, 
particularly if it has military value.”32 Furthermore, the editors argued that it was not 
possible to avoid the disadvantage as being the party that possessed the most 
knowledge, since America would be the side who would sacrifice more to make the 
international control possible. The paper left the public with a vague and open-ended 
consent: “If the exchange is to produce any benefits, the information has to be 
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disseminated to the whole scientific community of the world, for no one can predict 
what scientist is going to take a given piece of information and use it as a stepping 
stone.”33 Therefore, The Chicago Tribune possessed views mostly opposite of those 
of The New York Times because of its distrust of the Russians. This view was shared 
by a significant constituency among the Americans.  
Undoubtedly, at the center of these arguments and debates stood President 
Truman. Harry S. Truman, born in Missouri, served in the Infantry Division in World 
War I. After serving as a judge in Jackson Country, Missouri, he was elected as a 
Missouri senator under the banner of the Democratic Party in 1934 with the support 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt. In 1940, Truman won re-election, after an unremitting 
campaign, a victory which must be seen as a turning point in Truman's political 
career since it put him in a position to be considered a vice presidential candidate for 
the 1944 elections. Roosevelt chose Truman as his running mate, replacing the 
candidacy of Henry Wallace and the two won the election by a large electoral vote 
margin. On April 12, 1945, Eleanor Roosevelt summoned him to the White House, 
informing Truman that the president was dead. When he became president, Truman 
had been the vice president less then three months. Roosevelt did not inform his vice 
president either about foreign policy or about domestic policy issues. 34  
As top of the executive branch of the government, and the man who ordered 
the dropping of the atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he was responsible 
for shaping the foreign policy about the bomb. While Truman was serving as vice 
president under Franklin D. Roosevelt, he was not informed about the Manhattan 
Project. The sudden death of President Roosevelt put the burden of ending the war, 
the use of the bombs and the leading of post-war America and the world on the 
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shoulders of the new president. The future of the atomic bomb was not the sole 
concern of the American government at the time. The sudden end of the war with 
Japan left the country with uncertainty in the domestic arena. There were many loose 
ends to tie up for Truman including concerns over the following laws and issues: the 
Second War Powers Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, relief for veterans, taxes, 
government expenditures, federal subsidies, the Social Security Program, the 
National Health Program, etc. Furthermore, the field of foreign policy had changed 
dramatically as the world was now composed of a war-stricken Europe, two global 
powers, and the United Nations. Where the atomic bomb fell in the wide scope of 
these issues was not clear. The bomb could be used as a means to better ends, but at 
the same time, it could end up being the very reason for the development of a more 
unstable and dangerous world. Furthermore, the American public was still ignorant 
about the bomb, aside from their knowledge of its destructive power demonstrated in 
two Japanese cities. President Truman was ultimately responsible for America's 
place in this world. Therefore, one of the suggestions brought forth in early 
September 1945 was to begin general training of the American public concerning the 
issue of nuclear energy.35  
Amid these differing opinions and discussions, on September 30, 1945, 
Canadian Prime Minister William L. Mackenzie King informed President Truman 
about an elaborate Russian spy network36 operating in Canada and the United States 
concerning the atomic weapons. Truman was not surprised and was not willing to 
take any action that might cause a permanent damage in Soviet- American 
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relations.37 A few days later, Truman gave a message to Congress on the atomic 
bomb. The president started his October 3rd speech on how the bomb dramatically 
differed from previous weapons and how it could be used as a means to establish 
world peace. To use the bomb for the “future welfare of humanity,” the battle was to 
be fought on two fronts: the domestic and the international. In relation to domestic 
policy, Truman suggested the establishment of an atomic energy commission with 
members appointed by the president with the consent of the Senate. The activities 
and the basic principles under which the commission was to operate should be 
determined by Congress and anything related to the raw materials of nuclear energy 
was to be submitted to this commission. Concerning the international aspect of the 
issue, Truman accepted that,  
Scientific opinion appears to be practically unanimous that the 
essential theoretical knowledge upon which the discovery is based is 
already widely known. There is also substantial agreement that foreign 
research can come abreast of our present theoretical knowledge in 
time.38  
 
With this in mind, Truman asserted that the international control of the 
production and restraint of atomic weapons was too urgent to wait upon the 
completion of a functioning United Nations Organization. Therefore, Truman stated, 
the discussions about the bomb should include “an effort to work out arrangements 
covering the terms under which international collaboration and exchange of scientific 
information might safely proceed.”39 With this message, although Truman declared 
that he found an international arrangement vital, he neither clarified in what manner 
this approach would take place nor did he take a step towards Stimson’s proposal for 
immediately approaching the Soviet Union. Yet, this message revealed that Truman 
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was aware of a possible nuclear arms race and despite the strong reaction among his 
staff, he was in favor of international control of the bomb.  
The end of the war left Truman with expanded executive power, power 
which Congress wanted to restrain. The creation of a Special Senate Committee on 
Atomic Energy allowed Congress to affect foreign policy on matters related to 
atomic energy. The Congressmen were not very sympathetic to the idea of 
information exchange or international control. Richard Russell, a Senate Democrat, 
stated that, “I think we ought to keep the technical know-how to ourselves as long as 
possible.”40 Republican Senator Vandenberg agreed that America should retain its 
monopoly until the existence of “absolute free and untrammeled right of intimate 
inspection all around the globe.”41 Representative Chester E. Merrow put the 
opinions of many congressmen into words with the following statement: “Why 
anyone should desire to make available the knowledge we have acquired by our 
genius and our industry is beyond my comprehension.”42 The legislators were 
reluctant to approve international control not only because of the desire to limit 
executive power and to make the most of the two billion dollars poured into the 
Manhattan Project, which many saw as being wasted if information were shared, but 
also the skepticism how the Soviet Union might use the bombs. Senator Vandenberg 
claimed that it would be unthinkable to share the secret with the Soviet Union 
“behind its black-out curtain to do with it whatever Moscow pleases.”43 Senator 
Raymond Willis likewise expressed this distrust clearly: “we know that we shall use 
atomic energy as an instrument of peace. We do not know what is in the minds of 
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leaders of other nations.”44 The majority of the legislative branch was thus opposed 
to the idea of information exchange. This left Truman in a difficult position in 
maneuvering his foreign policy, since without the support of the Congress, it would 
be impossible to realize the international control of atomic weapons. 
There were, however, some Congress members who grasped that it was 
impossible to keep the other nations from developing their own nuclear bombs in the 
next decade with or without American help. Jerry Voorhis told the House that “if I 
believed for one moment that it was possible for the United States to keep the secret 
[…] that is what I would be doing.”45 Even Senator Vandenberg would later 
acquiesce on this point and started to support international control on the condition of 
infallible inspection was made possible. However, the supporters were still in a 
minority and most senators and congressmen tended to think that by the time other 
nations developed their atomic weapons “we shall […] be too far ahead of them they 
will be afraid to use the secret they have discovered.”46 When it became public that 
the Truman administration was preparing to divulge the information upon the advice 
of Secretary Wallace, a telegraph of the poll among the Congressmen was published 
in The New York Times, revealing the opposition: fifty-five out of sixty-one 
responding senators and representatives decidedly opposed sharing the knowledge of 
the bomb with any country.47 
The congressional opposition may be understood as simply a reflection of 
the public’s reaction to the future international control of atomic weapons. Even 
though opinion polls revealed that Americans understood that an American 
monopoly over nuclear weapons would not last, they were still reluctant to share the 
                                               
44
 Raymond Willis quoted in Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 255. 
45
 Jerry Voorhis quoted in Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 256. 
46
 Vandenberg The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, 224. 
47
 The New York Times, September 29, 1945. 
31 
 
knowledge. A survey conducted in September, 1945, showed that eighty-two percent 
of Americans expected other nations to develop their own nuclear weapons and 
eighty-five percent were in favor of retaining the monopoly as long as possible. The 
polls in August and September also divulged that seventy percent of those questioned 
were against the idea of turning the control of nuclear weapons over to the United 
Nations.48 Thus, the Truman administration had to overcome both congressional and 
public opposition to pursue a foreign policy favoring international control.  
These domestic concerns loomed large as the London Conference took 
place in September, 1945. The foreign ministers of the United States, the USSR, 
Great Britain, France and China met in London to shape peace treaties for Finland, 
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and all former German satellites. Even though America 
did not oppose the Soviet Union controlling these countries while the war was going 
on, with the end of the war, the conditions of the Yalta conference were to be 
honored by holding free elections.49 American officials were aware that the United 
States did not possess the power to influence the events taking place in these 
countries directly, however, with diplomacy they hoped to convince the Russians to 
be loyal to the Yalta accord. Secretary Byrnes went to London armed with this 
strategy of pressuring the Russians through diplomacy, a strategy which was also 
shared by the President. Byrnes hoped that American possession of the bomb could 
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be used as leverage against the Russians, hopes that proved to be empty when the 
Russian foreign minister Molotov did not respond favorably to American demands. 
The conference was disappointing because the ministers could not agree on any of 
the issues related to the free elections, the status of China and France in the post war 
world, or on the publishing of a public communiqué.50 Byrnes, in his disappointment, 
thought that, by being uncompromising, the Russians were after the uranium reserves 
in the Belgian Congo.51 The outcome of the London Conference was the 
augmentation of distrust towards the Russians. Furthermore, it proved that an 
American monopoly over the atomic bomb was not going to be as effective of a 
diplomatic weapon as American statesmen had thought. However, despite the failure 
of the London Conference, in a cabinet meeting in October, Truman was not ready to 
give up diplomacy, as stated in Wallace’s diaries: “the president made the point that 
we were not going to let the public know the extent to which the Russians had tried 
our patience but that we were going to find some way to get along with the 
Russians.”52 
The London Conference left a bitter taste in the mouths of the American 
statesmen which affected any further moves concerning the establishment of 
international control. Secretary Byrnes was worried that any attempt for premature 
control might result in further reluctance in honoring the Yalta Accord on the Soviet 
side. Byrnes thought that the Russians might want to see concrete efforts for 
international control before the issue of former German satellites was settled. 
Furthermore, the secretary did not find it feasible to establish a workable control 
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scheme because of the technical difficulties.53 The London Conference and the 
public opinion influenced Truman as evidenced in his first post-war speech delivered 
on October 27th in New York, a speech which also contained a clear message to the 
Soviet Union that the bomb was not a priority in the postwar treaties:  
In our possession of this weapon, as in our possession of other new 
weapons, there is no threat to any nation. The world, which has seen 
the United States in two great recent wars, knows that full well. The 
possession in our hands of this new power of destruction we regard as 
a sacred trust. Because of our love of peace, the thoughtful people of 
the world know that that trust will not be violated, that it will be 
faithfully executed. 54 
 
Even though this speech was perceived as a step back from the commitment 
to international control, it was merely an indication of how serious President Truman 
took the issue of peace settlement and how much he knew international control 
would not be possible without public support. An editorial in The New York Times 
interpreted this Navy Day speech as indicative of a step toward the control, not 
backing away from it. The editors pointed out that, even though at that time it was 
not possible to share the details about the manufacturing of the bomb, “the United 
States looks forward to the free exchange of fundamental scientific information with 
all nations, which presupposes and guarantees that these nations will reciprocate in 
good faith to establish effective methods of international control.”55 At this point, 
Forrestal eloquently described where Truman stood on the issue: “passionate but 
desirous of making peace as soon as possible, but was at the same time reluctant to 
relinquish an element of American power which might help shape the final 
settlement.”56 Consequently, Truman had to ascertain that the Soviets would comply 
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with measures taken to control the bomb, an assurance which could not be 
guaranteed until they took steps to keep their previous promises. As much as the 
President was desirous, he was also cautious.  
Truman’s hesitant passion can likewise be observed by his indication during 
the very same speech on October 27th that there would be a meeting with the 
Canadian and the British prime ministers concerning international control of the 
bomb.57 The first full session of the United Nations General Assembly was to be 
gathered in London in January, 1946 and something was to be done before then. 
When British Prime Minister Attlee offered to come to Washington with his 
Canadian counterpart, King, Truman announced that the meeting would take place in 
early November, three days after the speech in New York. 
The plans for the Truman-Attlee-King meeting were to be prepared by 
Vannevar Bush, who became the chairman of the National Defense Research 
committee in 1940 and a year later the director of the Office of Scientific Research 
and Development, which controlled the Manhattan Project. Five days before the 
arrival of the prime ministers, Bush presented his ideas to Secretary Byrnes. Bush 
wrote that the basic American intention was to avoid a future nuclear arms race that 
might lead to war. The difficulty was the suspicious stance of the Soviet Union. Bush 
thought the answer was “to make the agreements in such a manner that it will be in 
Russia’s interest to keep them.”58 Therefore, Bush suggested a three-step plan which 
would require confirmation from all parties after completion of each step. The first 
step was to invite the Russians to join the British and the Americans to create an 
organization under the supervision of the United Nations General Assembly to 
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circulate the scientific information on the nuclear physics. This first step was to 
function as a security check for the Americans so that the Russian intentions and 
level of commitment could be exposed, while the Americans were not making a 
sacrifice since the scientific knowledge had already been acquired by the Russians.  
The second step constituted a more concrete measure toward real control. 
This would involve the establishment of a United Nations Commission of Inspection 
which would have the authority to inspect the facilities and laboratories in the 
countries that undertook nuclear research. This commission would assume its 
functions gradually, so that the United States would not find itself in a 
disadvantageous position by revealing industrial secrets. After the second step was 
finalized, all the nations would agree on the third step, that being that the stockpiling 
of materials capable of atomic fission would be discharged for peaceful purposes 
only. The Commission was also responsible at this stage in overseeing the procedure 
and preventing any alteration. Bush suggested that until the full plan was perfected, 
the United States would keep gathering the materials that were necessary for the 
production of the bomb but would not assemble them. 59 
President Truman sanctioned these proposals on November 7th. With an 
additional step provided by the State Department, on November 15th, 1945, Truman, 
Attlee, and King accepted the plan and called for the creation of a United Nations 
agency that would work: 
1. for extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific 
information for peaceful ends; 
2. for control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to endure its 
use only for peaceful purposes; 
3. for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons 
and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; 
4. for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to 
protect complying states against the hazards of violations and 
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evasions.60 
 
The Truman-Attlee-King agreement was designed to prevent any premature 
relinquishment of the American nuclear monopoly. The declaration also clarified that 
these works would be undertaken step by step upon the completion of each phase. If, 
at any level, the Soviet Union failed to comply with the international agreement, the 
United States had the right to withdraw. Although, it was true that the plan and the 
practical aspects of it were still vague and disorganized, the Truman-Attlee-King 
Declaration constituted progress towards the international control of the atomic 
bomb and thereby revealed the positive intentions of the American government in the 
post-war world. This declaration showed where Truman stood in the spectrum of 
opinions in that, despite the unclear stance of the declaration, Truman had still made 
an unofficial commitment to international control. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
the Truman Administration was in favor of the international control of the atomic 
bomb and took concrete steps to realize this goal. A look at the two newspapers 
considered in this thesis also reinforce that these moves were understood to be 
definite measures toward international control of the bomb and reveal the highly 
divergent opinions of the public with respect to said actions. 
In November 1945, The New York Times reported on Mr. Attlee’s visit and 
stated that it was a only a matter of time before the other nations would build their 
atomic bombs. The editorial article clarified for the nation once more that there was 
no scientific secret about the bomb, but that “merely some processes of manufacture” 
were left unknown. After stating this, the paper strongly urged the exchange of 
information initiated by Britain, Canada and the United States in order “to make sure 
that bombs are never again put to use.”61 In this way the world would ensure that 
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science would never be employed to do evil on earth. After defending the exchange 
of information, the editors pointed out that such an action would require serious 
commitment and sacrifice from every member of the United Nations, and that the 
United States should be at the head of this race to peace. 62  
On the other hand, The Chicago Daily Tribune had a more conservative 
approach. The editorial of November 17th accused the leftists of trying to get Truman 
to “open atomic plants to the Russian copyists.”63 The editors of the paper argued 
that those who favored international cooperation were self-contradictory and desired 
to give the most powerful weapons of the history to the Russians, whose 
aggressiveness had been proven in Europe, the Balkans, Korea and Manchuria. 
However, they were satisfied with President Truman’s actions and urged him to 
acquire Greenland, which had strategic importance. The stance of this paper reveals 
the anxiety of American people and, by extension, most of the politicians. The very 
existence of the bomb created an insecure world in which the United States should 
build a safe zone for itself. The bomb was not to be shared. 
Despite its vagueness, the Truman-Attlee-King accord was thus understood 
to be the first concrete step towards the international control of atomic energy, and 
therefore a turning point in the post-war global politics. President Truman had 
heeded the advice of many, such as Stimson, Acheson and the scientists, and had 
taken steps to assure a more secure world brought forth by information exchange. 
However, Truman maintained his cautious stance by approving a plan in which the 
control would develop in phases and thus leave room to maneuver. This way, the 
president was able to please both those for and against the international control. In 
this atmosphere of hostility towards the Russians, it was important to attain this 
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balance if any progress was to be made toward international control. The fact that 
Truman did not have many supporters on this issue required a more cautious and 
balanced approach. Despite the opposition he faced, the president carried the future 
of the atomic weapons from the domestic to the international platform. Following 
this declaration, efforts turned to fixing this as an issue in the platform of the United 
Nations.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
“WHAT IS RUSSIA UP TO NOW?” 
 
The world has achieved brilliance without 
wisdom, power without conscience. Ours is a 
world of nuclear giants and ethical infants.  
─ Omar N. Bradley 
 
 
 
President Truman started the second volume of his memoirs with the 
subtitle Control of the Atomic Energy. The first sentences of the president revealed 
the chaos of the period following the war: “Within the first few months I discovered 
that being a president is like a man riding a tiger. He has to keep on riding or be 
swallowed.”64Concerning the future of nuclear weapons, the Truman-Attlee-King 
declaration was the first step towards the international control of atomic weapons, 
but there was much yet to come; the president had to “keep on riding.” The months 
after the meeting of the three leaders proved to be tough for Truman in both the 
domestic and international fields. From the foreign ministers’ conference in Moscow, 
to dealing with the first United Nations assembly in London and its aftermath, and 
finally, in addressing the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan, the Truman administration 
witnessed months of changing winds. Naturally, the international control of atomic 
weapons was also influenced by these changes. However, despite strong 
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congressional opposition, and even the strengthening of his own suspicions, Truman 
was not willing to give up on international cooperation. His reluctance to despair 
gave way to a positive outcome in the first Untied Nations meeting in January. 
Therefore, despite the darkening domestic atmosphere and the uncertain international 
mood, President Truman was able to pursue policies that made international control a 
realizable goal. 
By the end of November, 1945, Byrnes proposed another meeting of the Big 
Three foreign ministers to be held before Christmas in Moscow. Byrnes’ view of the 
Russians had changed slightly over the couple months following the London 
Conference. The secretary realized that it was not realistic to ask for American 
involvement in Eastern European countries, while the United States denied any 
Russian involvement in Japan. Byrnes was willing to compromise on these issues, 
since signing peace treaties for East Europe was going to open a door for the Russian 
troops to leave. Without any treaty, the Russians had legitimate grounds to keep the 
troops in place, and influence the domestic politics of these countries. Furthermore, 
by holding the conference in Moscow, it was possible to directly contact Stalin 
instead of trying to bend Foreign Minister Molotov’s seemingly unbreakable will.65 
Byrnes also altered his tactics with regard to atomic energy. In a speech he delivered 
in South Carolina a couple days before his departure for London, he made remarks 
supporting the control of atomic energy: “without the united effort and unremitting 
co-operation of all the nations in the world, there will be no enduring and effective 
protection again the atomic bomb.”66 After the Truman-Attlee-King meeting, the 
Secretary of State planned to introduce the accord at the first meeting of the United 
Nations General Assembly in January 1946. However, atomic scientists, their 
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supporters in the Congress and Byrnes' advisers suggested that the Russians should 
be informed about the meeting of three leaders in November before the United 
Nations meeting in January. Byrnes gave in to the pressures and decided to notify the 
Soviet Foreign Minister about the Truman-Attlee-King declaration during the 
conference at Moscow. The secretary arranged a committee of advisers to draft what 
should be communicated to the Russians in Moscow.67  
Byrnes' advisers prepared a proposal for the meeting in Moscow in 
alignment with the four basic phases of the Truman-Attlee-King declaration. 
However, the draft omitted one of the most important conditions of the declaration. 
What made this process safe for the American government was the provision that the 
each new phase was to be started only under the condition that the previous one was 
fulfilled. The draft proposal suggested that “successful international action with 
respect to any phase of the problem is not necessarily a prerequisite for undertaking 
affirmative action with respect to other phases.”68 This change was important 
because it made the scientific knowledge and information exchange possible prior to 
any establishment of safeguards. The reason the state department undertook this 
change is unknown; however, it can be perceived as an extra effort to appeal to the 
Russians to solve the problem in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, Congress would 
find this proposal hard to approve without the inclusion of the safeguard conditions, 
which guaranteed American security. Before leaving for Moscow, Byrnes met with 
the Senate Foreign Relations and Atomic Energy committees to brief them on his 
plans for the meeting in Moscow. Despite Byrnes' briefing, the senators were angry 
at the way the secretary had altered the Truman-Attlee-King declaration and they 
resented that the state department did not consult them before taking any action. 
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Their primary concern was that the way the declaration was amended could cause 
premature commitment on an issue as controversial as atomic energy. The senators 
were opposed to releasing any scientific data without establishing the proper 
investigation process by the United Nations. Furthermore, when the senators learned 
that Dr. James B. Conant69 was going to Moscow to accompany the secretary of 
state, they became even more furious at Byrnes for trusting a policy issue to a college 
professor. This strong senatorial criticism did not significantly affect Byrnes, 
however, and he left for Moscow two days after the meeting. Seeing that they did not 
have much impact on the secretary of state, the senators requested a meeting with the 
President himself.70 
The senators, including Connally and Vandenberg, met with Truman two 
days after Byrnes left for Moscow, on December 14, 1945. When they 
communicated their concerns about the draft, even though the president was not 
pleased with the alterations, he did not take any action to stop Byrnes, even declining 
a suggestion that he could contact the secretary via the radio. After the meeting, 
Senator Vandenberg stated that, “we shall hold the Executive Department 
responsible. It is our unanimous opinion that the Byrnes formula must be stopped.”71 
Truman was left in a position where it was necessary to appeal to the senators' 
opinions and also further the attempts to establish international control. At a cabinet 
meeting, Truman defended Byrnes by stating that America was not that much ahead 
of the game. Wallace recorded in his diary entry how Truman saw the issue:  
The president said he was convinced that they [the senators] were 
wrong; that the Russians had just as good scientists as we had; that the 
scientific information was now available to everyone and that it was 
                                               
69
 James Bryant Conant was the president of Harvard University from 1933 to 1953. He also served as 
the chairman of the National Defense Research committee and played a key role in the Manhattan 
Project. 
70
 Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War,278. 
71
 Herken, The Winning Weapon, 78-79. 
43 
 
important that we help create an atmosphere of worldwide 
confidence.72  
 
The President's opinion on where Russian science stood in regards to 
American nuclear science did not mean that he trusted the Soviet Government. He, 
too, had reservations on how international control was to be achieved, but his 
suspicions differed from those of the senators and the congressmen. Therefore, there 
was a misperception about Truman's and Byrnes' stance towards the Russians. 
Neither statesman relied on the trustworthiness of the Soviet government more than 
any senator: 
What the senators did not understand, in their anger and ignorance, 
was that they hardly differed from Byrnes and Truman. It was not, as 
Vandenberg naively assumed, that the administration was acting in 
trust of the Soviet Union and the senators counseling mistrust. All 
agreed on mistrust to the Soviets—but not on the tactics that mistrust 
required.73 
 
At the same time, Truman did take note of the senators' opinions, as 
evidenced by the fact that, after the meeting, the President ordered the 
Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, who had been present as well, to cable a full 
transcript of the discussions. In spite of this, however, the President did not waver in 
his confidence in Byrnes. The undersecretary echoed the President's support of the 
secretary of state in his memoirs: “The President had me reassure Byrnes that the 
congressional flurry had not disturbed him, adding that he would be glad to consider 
any proposals the Russians might have.”74 On December 17, the secretary of state 
replied to the President that he never intended to approve of an information exchange 
without proper safeguards and assured the President that he would undertake a more 
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strict policy toward the issue compatible with the declaration of the three leaders. 
When this conflict was leaked to the public, Truman stated that the secretary of state 
had his full confidence and support in Moscow. 75  
Thus, Truman’s attitude toward the Moscow conference involved a complex 
balancing of interests, the most compelling of which were the following: First, the 
opposition of these senators was an important consideration for Truman as he was 
not willing to alienate them for the international control of the bomb; he was well 
aware that their support was indispensable to carry out any sound foreign and 
domestic policy. Thus, he had to find a way to appeal to the senators to gain their 
support back. In addition to the consideration of the senators’ opposition, another 
primary concern for Truman was the Soviet actions in the Middle East and in the 
Balkans. By the winter of 1945, there were more than half a million Russian troops 
in Bulgaria and some were moving to Iran. Truman knew that he had no recourse 
when the Soviets undertook fait accompli involvements in these countries.76 And, 
finally, the criticisms Truman accepted on behalf of Byrnes and the lack of 
communication on the part of the secretary resulted in further problems between the 
two men. All of these matters influenced the way Truman replied to Byrnes and the 
way he approached the international control of atomic energy in Moscow. 
Meanwhile in Moscow, it was easier for the secretary of state to secure 
Soviet Union approval for the formation of a United Nations Atomic Energy 
Commission than it was to garner congressional support. The Russians did not show 
much interest in the issue and accepted the American plan except for requesting that 
the commission would report to the Security Council instead of the General 
Assembly. The arguments on the issue of which body would be reported to lasted a 
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couple of days both because such a decision would be definitive regarding the future 
of atomic weapons and because each option had certain advantages for the two 
superpowers. If the commission was responsible to the General Assembly, it would 
be more advantageous for the United States, since most of the countries participating 
in the General Assembly were sympathetic to the American cause. On the other 
hand, if the Security Council was in charge, the Soviet Union would have veto 
power, which gave them the capacity to control the developments. When Byrnes 
could not manage to persuade the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, he requested a 
meeting with Stalin. The two times Byrnes and Stalin met resulted in an agreement, 
of which the only concession from the Truman-Attlee-King declaration was that the 
UN commission on atomic energy would operate under the Security Council. Other 
than this problematic topic, the conferees agreed that the commission would suggest 
in stages the basic scientific knowledge exchange, limit the use of weapons of mass 
destruction starting with the nuclear weapons and set up strong safeguards. The 
Truman-Attlee-King declaration had paved the way and the Moscow Conference 
Communiqué fell in step by asserting that the international control of the atomic 
weapons would be carried out in stages: “the work of the Commission should 
proceed by different stages, the successful completion of each of which will develop 
the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken.”77 
Therefore, with the recognition of the Big Three Agreement by the Soviets, the 
American delegation felt assured about the peaceful future of atomic weapons. 
Clearly, the Moscow Conference was not solely about the future of nuclear 
weapons; rather, it also dealt largely with the post-war arrangements of Eastern 
Europe and East Asia. Byrnes returned home with concessions from the Russians on 
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most of these issues. While the problems in Iran and Greece were not solved, both 
sides agreed to hold a peace conference including France and China. Even though the 
Moscow Conference had ended with more positive results than the London 
Conference, the Republicans at home were not happy with the concessions made 
concerning the atomic bomb. Some members of the Truman administration, as well 
as many senators and congressmen, did not see why the United States had to give up 
its dominant position by being willing to allow international control of the atomic 
bomb. Since most of the statesmen believed that the United States was years ahead of 
the Soviet Union, even on the topic of nuclear science, the exchange of any 
information from their perspective constituted sharing the “secret” of the bomb. They 
feared that the scientists who went to Moscow as a part of the US delegation might 
have shared vital information with the Russians. Furthermore, the events of the 
previous year and the way Russia had dealt with its peripheral countries seemed to 
justify their suspicions about the Stalinist government. As a result, in the days after 
the Moscow Conference “the atomic blackout block”78 was significantly 
strengthened. Therefore, although the secretary of state saw this conference as a 
success and returned to America with confidence that he would gain presidential, 
congressional and senatorial approval, things looked much different from the other 
side of the Atlantic.  
It is important to note that although the domestic reluctance for 
collaboration with the Soviets was getting stronger, the Truman administration was 
relying, not on the good intentions of the Russian government, but on the assumption 
that they, too, were driven by their own national security concerns, like the United 
States. However, those who endorsed this national security position started to doubt 
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the intentions of the Moscow government after seeing the situation in Iran and 
Eastern Europe. Especially after the Moscow Conference and the more 
compromising attitude of the Byrnes delegation, many politicians were led to believe 
that the Soviets would do anything to slow down and weaken America's progress. 
Thus, most people in Washington saw the Russian collaboration on atomic energy as 
nothing more than a game, giving the Soviet scientists more time to catch up while 
the Russians acted like they were as interested in “world peace” as the United States 
was. This shift in the public view of Russian politics increased the anti-Soviet feeling 
in the United States and, it can be argued, affected foreign policy in the long run.79 
The Moscow Conference, as mentioned briefly above, also led to a conflict 
between Secretary of State Byrnes and President Truman. Byrnes enjoyed a 
relatively independent position in the Roosevelt Administration during the war as the 
mobilization and reconversion director. Therefore, when Byrnes became the 
secretary of state, he desired a similar kind of independence, which had the potential 
to cause separation between him and the president; this desire may be observed in his 
dealings in foreign relations, and thus in the Moscow Conference. He did not stay in 
proper communication with the president while he was in Russia partly because he 
thought there was a leak and was therefore reluctant to send telegrams to the White 
House as they might not be secure. From December 16 to December 26, Byrnes sent 
only one telegram directly to the president, which was not informative at all, as the 
president himself observed: “It was more like one partner in business telling the other 
that his business trip was progressing well and not to worry.”80 When Byrnes 
published the Moscow Conference Communiqué without consulting the president, an 
unnerved Truman awaited the return of the secretary. Upon his arrival, the president, 
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the secretary of state and some other officials met on the presidential yacht, the 
Williamsburg. Though the accounts of what exactly happened on the Williamsburg 
are not consistent, one certainty is that the relationship between the president and the 
secretary of state deteriorated. As mentioned above, this difficulty with the secretary 
of state, along with the congressional opposition, created a negative atmosphere in 
which the president had to function in the aftermath of the Moscow Conference. 
After the Williamsburg meeting, when the president examined the 
documents of the Moscow Conference left by Byrnes, he concluded that all was not 
as it had appeared: “it became abundantly clear to me that the successes of the 
Moscow Conference were unreal.”81 Truman was especially unhappy that Byrnes 
was not able to get any concessions from the Soviets concerning the international 
control of the bomb and withdrawal of the Russian troops from Iran. This 
dissatisfaction was the result of different objectives and expectations. For Truman, 
one of the most important issues of the conference should have been the post-war 
situation of Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Since the secretary could not get 
any concessions regarding these problems, Truman was disappointed and this failure 
enhanced his distrust of the Russians. He expressed his disappointment in his 
memoirs referring to the Moscow Conference: “I could see that the Russians had 
given us no more than a general promise that they would be willing to sit down and 
talk again about the control of the atomic energy.”82 On the other hand, Byrnes 
looked back to other prior conferences and thought the Moscow Conference had 
been just as successful, if not more so, as there had been many accomplishments in 
Moscow compared to the previous years. Moreover, the president's dissatisfaction 
with the conference's outcome, in a way, reflected upon his interaction with Byrnes. 
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Truman called Byrnes two weeks after his return and told him that the 
communication between the secretary of state and the chief executive was vital as 
evidenced by the result of this Moscow Conference. In the end, due to personal, 
domestic and international reasons, Truman saw the Conference not as a success on 
the way to permanent peace, but as a tactical diplomatic move which did not promise 
anything, either on the atomic energy or on the future of Eastern European or Middle 
Eastern countries.  
With regard to public opinion at this juncture, The New York Times 
supported both the United Nations and international weapons control. In an editorial 
published on December 2, 1945, the editors argued that world peace was only 
possible with the United Nations and that this organization would be the only one 
that the nation could trust for the control of the atomic weapons.83 The paper also 
embraced the Moscow Conference with hope and anticipation, stating that this was a 
renewed effort to “mend the broken strands of international peace negotiations.”84 
The paper pointed out that the big powers of the world seemed more separated and 
there had not been any steps taken to restore peace since the London Conference. On 
the other hand, the hope of the editors was tempered as they recognized the 
limitations of solving the world’s problems in only a couple of days of discussion. 
After the conference, The New York Times applauded the success of the meetings, 
citing the establishment of a United Nations Atomic Energy Agency as the most 
important outcome.85  
The Chicago Tribune, on the other hand, saw the meeting in Moscow as a 
chance for Truman and Byrnes to fix what they had done wrong in Potsdam. The 
editors of the paper criticized the leaders for opening the nation's wealth to other 
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nations without receiving any payment. The paper believed that the only way to 
direct the Truman administration's policy was to pressure it with public opinion.86 
Furthermore, while Byrnes and the American delegation were in Moscow, the paper 
called on the government to resume the scientific research on nuclear weapons. The 
editors expressed their endorsement of nuclear armament by stating that “we might 
be getting a start on how to live with and master the problems of the atomic age, 
instead of sitting around wondering if we'll all be blown up some bright day.”87 The 
timing of this editorial reflected how the paper saw the international control of 
atomic weapons. Instead of arguing for disarmament, the paper spoke against the 
foreign policy of Truman administration by identifying the failure of Truman and 
Byrnes and the wasted assets of the Manhattan Project. 
By this time domestic American politics, which had been moving towards a 
more skeptical and conservative stance, became an overriding problem of the 
Truman administration. President Roosevelt and his administration built a bipartisan 
foreign policy after Pearl Harbor and this was one of the biggest strengths of the 
country during the war. However, starting from the end of the war, the new Truman 
administration did not enjoy this bipartisan calm because of the prejudices against 
both a strong executive branch and a foreign policy favoring the Soviet Union. This 
bipartisan unity was falling apart by the end of 1945 and the beginning of 1946, as 
will be detailed below. The Republicans were dissatisfied with the Truman 
government's foreign policy since the end of the war. Because the executive branch 
had gained so much freedom and authority during the war, Congress reacted, as 
might be expected, with skepticism and a desire to investigate the way the new 
administration made policy. As a result, the more sensitive issues, like atomic 
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energy, attracted even more attention. The Moscow Conference and Byrnes' 
concessions reinforced their suspicions about the administration and resulted in 
strong opposition, which was to haunt the Truman administration thereafter. 
Republican dissatisfaction with the Truman administration started in the fall 
of 1945 when leading members accused Byrnes of forming diplomatic policy without 
consulting them. This uneasiness before the London Conference was not relieved 
even though Byrnes invited John Foster Dulles, who was a legal consultant to 
President Wilson and helped Senator Vandenberg to draft the United Nation 
Charter,88 to be a part of the London delegation. After the London Conference, the 
Republican criticism directed at the administration policies accelerated. In 
December, 1945, the Republican members of the Congress issued a joint statement 
entailing a firmer stance on the issue of fulfilling wartime promises made to smaller 
nations. Governor Dwight Green of Illinois stated that “the shameful betrayal of 
Poland” should not be forgotten or tolerated. On an even stronger note, after the 
Moscow Conference, Senator Homer Capehart of Indiana compared Byrnes' 
concessions to “Chamberlain and his umbrella appeasement of Hitler.”89 Senator 
Vandenberg was also a strong defender of a more strict policy towards the Russians, 
who looked upon the Byrnes' policy “with deep reservations [...] regarding the 
consistency and clear-sighted and self-interest of our policy practiced by Byrnes.”90 
The opposition was gaining strength.  
To appease the Republicans and stronger opponents like Vandenberg, in 
December, Truman asked Vandenberg and Dulles to represent the Republican Party 
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at the first meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, which was to gather the 
following month. The Michigan senator reserved the right to resign if he disagreed 
with the proposals concerning the international control of atomic energy. 
Vandenberg wrote Dulles that he might return earlier than expected “if at London I 
collide with a Truman-Byrnes appeasement policy which I cannot stomach.”91 When 
Vandenberg read the transcript of the Moscow conference, he was on the verge of 
resigning: 
It listed four stages for the work of the UNO commission─ 
“disclosures” FIRST and total “security” LAST. Then it said that “the 
work of the Commission should proceed by separate stages” and that 
each “stage” should be completed before the next is undertaken. It 
seemed to me that this could be read in no other way than that the 
precise thing is to happen against which both our committee and the 
Foreign Relations Committee is so earnestly opposed. I felt that I had 
no right to go to London, as a Senate spokesman, under any such 
instructions to promote any such objectives.92  
 
However, when Vandenberg complained about this situation to Acheson, 
the undersecretary of state arranged a meeting between the senator and the president. 
Truman and Acheson persuaded Vandenberg that the Moscow Conference was 
strongly tied to the Truman-Attlee-King accord and that inspection and security were 
the priorities with regard to the international control of atomic weapons. After his 
meeting with the president on December 28, 1945, the senator not only agreed to go 
to London, but even thought that the circumstances demanded he be present at such a 
vital meeting. Because the bare text of the Moscow Conference did not include 
Truman's qualifications on the issue, Vandenberg believed that this agreement could 
not be the foundation of the proposal that would be presented to the General 
Assembly.  
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In London, Vandenberg and Dulles pressured Byrnes on pursuing a more 
assertive policy with the Russians. Vandenberg was fearful that Byrnes “might be 
tempted to yield on vital issues for harmony's sake.”93 Eleanor Roosevelt, who was 
another American representative present at London, observed the situation of the 
American officials: “Secretary Byrnes is afraid of his own delegation.”94 Thus, the 
delegation in London was a picture of American domestic politics in miniature. This 
time, in contrast to the previous conferences, Byrnes had to bring dissenting voices 
with him and thereby could not help but grasp the strength of his opposition. 
When Byrnes returned from London, he did not have much hope in the 
future bipartisanship of American foreign policy and stated to his friends that: 
“Vandenberg's –and for that matter Dulles's-- activities from now on could be viewed 
as conducted on a political and partisan basis.”95 Byrnes's concerns were not 
unfounded. The statements of Vandenberg and Dulles upon their return from London 
pointed to a firmer foreign policy which required a change in direction from those 
currently employed:  
It is our right and it is our duty to speak in these councils just as firmly 
and just as earnestly for ideals of justice and the fundamentals of 
freedom as it is for others in the UNO to assert their viewpoints. I 
hope to see the Government of the United States more firmly assert its 
moral leadership in these respects.96 
 
The Republican opposition intensified after the UN meeting in London. The 
criticism by the GOP became so strong by February, 1946, that Senator Vandenberg 
rose at a Senate meeting and demanded:  
We ask it in Manchuria. We ask it in Eastern Europe and the 
Dardanelles [...] We ask it in the Baltic and in the Balkans. We ask it 
in Poland [...] We ask it in Japan. We ask it sometimes even in 
                                               
93
 Ibid., 237. 
94
 Eleanor Roosevelt quoted in Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 292. 
95
 Byrnes quoted in Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 292. 
96
 Arthur Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, 231. 
54 
 
connection with events in our own United States. What is Russia up to 
now? 97 
 
In the same speech, the Michigan senator praised many statesmen, including 
some French and English diplomats, but avoided making any positive remarks about 
Truman's foreign policy or Secretary of State Byrnes. When he finished his speech, 
the Senate and the galleries gave their approval by applauding him standing and 
forming long lines to shake his hand, serving as an indicator for the Truman 
administration that if they continued their compromising policy, as they had in 
Moscow and London, they would not find congressional support behind them.98  
Concerning the United Nations meeting in London, The New York Times 
strongly urged full support of the delegation in an editorial of the beginning of the 
year: “The alternative is unthinkable: for the almost certain result of a competitive 
race in the production of atomic weapons is mutual destruction.”99 After the UN 
meeting in London, the paper informed the American public about the content of the 
agreement reached regarding the establishment of United Nations Atomic Energy 
Commission. However, the editorial of January 25, 1946, was more skeptical than 
the previous ones. The editors had many reservations concerning the efficiency and 
the future of the United Nations. Time would reveal the limits of the organization 
and, by the spring of 1946, even the most heated advocates of the international 
control of atomic weapons ceased to hope in its viability.  
After the United Nations meeting, the secretary of state was determined to 
present a policy for the international control of atomic energy. Byrnes appointed a 
committee composed of five men: Acheson as chairperson and Groves, Conant, 
Bush, and Wall Street Attorney and former Assistant Secretary of War John 
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McCloy100 as the members. Except for Groves, all of the members of the committee 
were closely associated with Stimson and, thus, they were more prone than Byrnes to 
support a generous policy towards the Soviet Union. However, Bush and his 
associate Conant had earned Byrnes' respect and trust after making an agreement 
with him in November, 1945. The Acheson Committee appointed a Board of 
Consultants: David E. Lilienthal, Oppenheimer, Charles A. Thomas, vice-president 
of Monsanto Chemical Corporation and expert on plutonium chemistry, Chester I. 
Barnard, president of New Jersey Bell Telephone and Harry Winne, vice president in 
charge of engineering for General Electric and a former participant in the Manhattan 
Project.101 Similar to the previous Interim Committee, these groups also consisted of 
elite members of scientific, corporate, legal and governmental societies and therefore 
were not under direct political pressures. They were also acknowledged as 
possessing the necessary specialization and competence to understand this specific 
problem and produce a solution for it.102  
Lilienthal had been appointed by President Roosevelt as one of the three 
directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1933. He served as the chairman of 
the authority from 1941 to 1946. When asked by Undersecretary Acheson to be the 
chair of the consultant team, Lilienthal described their job by saying, “our work is to 
develop a position, based on facts not known by our political officers, that will 
'work,' and have a good chance of being accepted, especially by Russia.”103 The 
consultants formulated a report and presented it to the Acheson committee. 
Following the discussions in the Acheson committee, the report took its final form 
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with slight changes made by the committee. The report prepared by the consultants 
suggested a program that minimized inspections and did not rely on sanction for its 
vitality, but instead offered to focus on raw materials, such as uranium and thorium. 
The plan suggested that the ownership of these raw materials should be given to an 
international agency—The Atomic Development Authority (ADA)—which would 
lead to international control of atomic energy, keeping in mind that without these 
specific materials the enrichment and building if the bomb would be impossible. 
With this plan, instead of trying to carry out the negative task of preventing violation, 
the ADA had the positive task of promoting and guiding the peaceful development of 
atomic energy. Therefore, the ADA was not solely a peacekeeping force relying on 
the local governments who already possessed the bomb. Instead, by giving the raw 
materials to a plethora of countries, the plan attempted to create a safer atmosphere 
by making the materials available for other nations to develop their nuclear bombs in 
the event of a seizure of a country, which could cause a nuclear war. This way, the 
weaker countries would also own nuclear weapons, which would function as 
deterrents against the hostile countries.  
Although there was less emphasis on inspections, the plan still called for 
free access to nuclear plants to detect possible deviations from the established codes. 
As a member of the Acheson Committee, Bush feared that the loss of American 
monopoly would leave the Soviets as the sole military super power in the world. 
Because of his influence, this plan was also to be carried out in stages, the first being 
the survey of the raw material and the last being the surrender of the nuclear 
monopoly. The only risk involved for the United Sates was the exchange of 
theoretical knowledge, which was still a gray area since there was not a consensus as 
to if this was sharing the “secret” of the bombs or not. This information exchange 
57 
 
might make it slightly easier for the Soviets to develop their nuclear bombs, but it 
was a slight risk that did not jeopardize American security to a significantly greater 
degree. Furthermore, the plan gave America the opportunity to retain its nuclear 
arsenal until the finalization of the last stage, preventing any premature disarmament 
which could imperil American security. Another positive loophole was that the 
report stayed silent on whether the United States could still produce nuclear bombs 
while the plan was in effect, thus providing the Americans with the ability to stay 
ahead of the nuclear armament if the plan failed, and thereby saving its advantageous 
position.104 
The Acheson-Lilienthal plan, as it came to be known, was not as generous 
as its authors had believed. The previous dealings of these men were much more 
open to a flexible plan concerning the future of the bomb. However, this plan was 
written in an atmosphere of fear and suspicion. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
a Russian spy ring, which was trying to attain atomic secrets in both Canada and in 
the United States, was just exposed in Canada, justifying and reinforcing the 
suspicions of many. The plan had to address the suspicions of those who were 
against any collaboration with the Soviet Union concerning atomic energy. Although 
the plan foresaw a crucial information exchange before adequate safeguards were 
included, this exchange still involved little risk for the United States. On the other 
hand, there were several risks involved for the Soviets putting them in a 
disadvantageous position. First of all, the plan required the penetration of Russian 
secrecy, on which Soviet security depended. Moreover, the plan guaranteed the 
American nuclear monopoly until Russia would have developed the bomb by its own 
means anyway. But because the ADA would possess the right to control all plants 
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and materials, the Soviets would not have any chance to break the American 
monopoly while the United States was able maintain a nuclear arsenal. If the United 
States chose to abolish the plan right before the final stage was completed, the Soviet 
Union would have been left even further behind the United States, prolonging the 
American monopoly.105  
The Acheson group was not trying to create an artificial atmosphere of 
American generosity either in domestic policy or in the international field. Most of 
these men had been strong supporters of international control, of which the Soviet 
Union would be the most important party. Undoubtedly, they were supporting 
cooperation with the Russians, in contrast to Senator Vandenberg or Tom Connally, 
who were against any form of appeasement with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, 
Acheson and his group were still operating in a hostile and suspicious atmosphere, 
which, in some respects, forced them to be more cautious. One cannot assume that 
these men were free from any kind of anti-Russian sentiments or did not have any 
reservations concerning the sincerity and trustworthiness of the Russians. But 
compared to most of their counterparts, they were willing to leave a door open for 
collaboration concerning atomic weapons.  
During the discussions, the Committee members tried to create the safest 
and the most secure plan for the United States without paying much attention to how 
the Kremlin would react to this plan. However, they did not find it appropriate to 
include any wording expressing distrust during the implementations of the stages and 
so they assumed “the good faith of Russia.” Since they were primarily concerned 
with protecting American security, overemphasis of this focus resulted in a plan 
which was hard for the Soviet Union to accept. In any case, considering the current 
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domestic atmosphere, a proposal that would gain Russian approval would have not 
been accepted by the Senate and the House as Bernstein observed:  
[B]y the spring of 1946, greater boldness might have been political 
suicide. Indeed, the authors might have been condemned as foolish 
visionaries. There were not many in America then who would have 
welcomed a bolder report.106 
 
There were also further indications that attitudes in government as well as in 
the public sphere were becoming increasingly anti-Soviet, a trend which must have 
been noted by the Acheson group as well. One such indication of these changing 
attitudes was the February 1946 telegram from George F. Kennan to the Secretary of 
State. The United States Chargé D'affaires in Moscow sent a 5300-word telegram 
explaining how Stalin saw the world and the politics. According to Kennan, Stalin 
needed a hostile world to legitimize his own authority in the country and, therefore, 
used international politics to strengthen his own autocracy.107 According to Kennan, 
Stalinists used Marxism and Leninism as:  
justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the 
dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties 
they did not dare to inflict, for sacrifice they felt bound to demand. In 
the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their 
methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is fig leaf 
of their moral and intellectual respectability.108 
 
There were other developments as well, pointing as Kennan did, to greater 
misgivings about the Soviet Union. One of the most important of these was 
Churchill's “Iron Curtain” speech. In this speech Churchill demonized the Soviet 
Union to the extent that it made it impossible to deal with the Russians in a realist 
political way. Former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill used the term “Iron 
Curtain” in his speech to Westminster College in Missouri on March 5, 1946:  
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From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an “iron curtain” 
has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals 
of the ancient states of central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, 
Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these 
famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call 
the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only 
to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing 
measure of control from Moscow.109 
 
The speech constituted a call for an Anglo-American coalition against the 
Soviet Union. He made the same remarks in the House of Commons and in New 
York. It should be stated that Churchill had great influence on the American people, 
even after Roosevelt's death. His words had an astounding effect on the Americans 
and many in the world. Churchill did not call solely for a political alliance but a 
military pact as well110:  
Our American military colleagues, [...] A world organization has 
already been erected for the prime purpose of preventing war [...]We 
must make sure that its work is fruitful [...] Anyone can see with his 
eyes open that our path will be difficult and also long, but if we 
persevere together as we did in the two world wars—though not, alas, 
in the interval between them—I cannot doubt that we shall achieve 
our common purpose in the end. 111 
 
The winds in America and in the West were thus blowing in an anti-Soviet 
and anti-communist direction. Furthermore, the Soviets themselves contributed to 
this trend when they did not withdraw their troops from Iran by the March 2, 1946 
deadline, a date confirmed by the Kremlin.112 Therefore, the year of 1946 inherited 
and reinforced the uncertainty of the year 1945 regarding the future of atomic 
weapons.  
The president was not immune to this change either. It cannot be assumed 
that President Truman trusted the Soviets more than the congressmen or the senators. 
                                               
109
  Winston S. Churchill, “Iron Curtain” Speech, March 5, 1946: 
http://www.seattleu.edu/artsci/history/us1945/docs/icsp.htm/ 
110
  Henry B. Ryan, The Vision of Anglo-America: The US-UK Alliance and the Emerging Cold 
War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 170-171. 
111
  Winston S. Churchill, “Iron Curtain” 
112
  Truman, Memoirs by Harry S Truman: Years of Trial and Hope, 98-99. 
61 
 
As a matter of fact, the new year ushered in more distrust and doubt for Truman as 
the first quarter of 1946 was marked with a decline in the hopes of international 
control of the atomic bomb. Although the president did not give up the attempts to 
solve this problem and to be the architect of the Cold War of coming years, the seed 
of doubt kept growing. Despite these reservations, Truman continued his plan of 
international control of atomic energy. Therefore, though it was clear that Soviet-
American relations were becoming more distant either because of domestic 
opposition or because of Truman’s personal convictions, the president was not 
willing to paralyze the future of atomic energy. 
Nonetheless, in the second quarter of 1946 suspicion, opposition and anti-
communism took a firm hold on American foreign policy. Reaching its climax in 
June 1946, the cooling of relations that had started earlier in the year came to a 
breaking point, leaving international control as an unrealized dream. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
“IT WENT BOOM AND IT KILLED MILLIONS” 
 
 
The atomic bomb survivors... cannot wait another 
50 years. Their highest hope is to see the 
abolition of nuclear weapons within their own 
lifetime. It is a steep climb to this goal, but one 
from which we must never relent. 
─ Iccho Itoh 
 
 
 
In 1946, American and Russian visions of the post-war world started to 
move to different directions. The Soviet Union wanted to secure its western border 
by buttressing communist regimes in the Eastern European countries and therefore 
supported communist parties in Poland, Hungary, Romania, Ukraine, 
Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. The growing Soviet influences in these countries 
resulted in suspicion and distrust with respect to Stalinist foreign policy. 
Furthermore, in March, the British troops withdrew from Iran, as mentioned in the 
last chapter, but the Soviet troops remained as Stalin attempted to establish a pro-
Soviet regime in Iran. After United States pressure, however, the Russian troops 
were withdrawn in May. Another episode which revealed Stalinist foreign policy 
priorities was the Russian support of the Greek civil war, which broke out in 1942 
but took a different shape with the involvement of the Greek Communist Party. 
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Therefore, atomic diplomacy was to be formed in an international atmosphere with 
growing Soviet influence.113 
In the midst of the growing suspicion and opposition, Truman did not 
forsake the prospect of the international control of atomic weapons. The ever-
growing mistrust clearly affected the way he perceived the foreign policy and the 
place of the Soviet Union in the world; however, he also knew that he had to work 
with this same Russian government in order to make the control of nuclear weapons 
viable. Thus he did not abandon the idea of international control in the midst of the 
unstable and unpredictable international politics. The time came for the Truman 
administration to appoint somebody to present the American plan for the United 
Nations Atomic Energy Committee meeting in June 1946. This man had to be 
somebody who would be approved of by Congress and by the people, and yet, who 
would also be supportive of the administration’s position on the issue. Indeed this 
appointment proved more vital than Truman realized as Bernard Baruch’s 
appointment led to the creation of the Baruch Plan, which was ultimately rejected by 
the Soviet government putting an end to the hope of the international control of 
atomic weapons.  
In March 1946, Truman appointed Bernard Baruch as the United States 
ambassador to the United Nations Atomic Energy Committee. This was an important 
strategic move for Truman because, as the Republican opposition was getting 
stronger in both houses, he had to bring someone onto the scene who would ease the 
tensions with his personal connections and political past. In his memoirs, Truman 
mentions his correspondence with Byrnes about the future of atomic diplomacy if 
such tensions could not be tempered. He feared that Congress could pass a law about 
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atomic energy that would undercut the effort on the international control thereby 
making it impossible for America to take part in any kind of international 
arrangement concerning nuclear weapons. Therefore, upon the suggestion of 
Byrnes114, Truman decided on Bernard Baruch as the spokesman.115 Baruch was a 
good choice for the Truman administration mainly because the popular support for 
Truman’s presidency was decreasing and the Secretary of State was seen as being 
soft on communism. Baruch was seen as an ideal candidate in light of these 
circumstances as he “had the esteem of the Congress, the confidence of the nation, 
and the respect and the friendship of Byrnes.”116 Truman expressed his reasons for 
Baruch appointment as follows:  
Bernard M. Baruch seemed to me to be the most logical man, and for 
several reasons. Not the least important of these was that Baruch 
enjoyed considerable esteem in the Senate. His association with the 
administration's plan for the control of atomic energy might help 
remove some of the opposition to the McMahon Bill in the Congress. 
Baruch had also succeeded, over the years, in forming many 
friendships abroad, including that of Winston Churchill, and during a 
long life he had acquired the prestige of an “elder statesman.”117 
 
The press also endorsed the appointment of Baruch as The Chicago Tribune 
stated “we can all sleep better at night knowing ... clear-eyed Bernie Baruch is on 
guard.”118 On the other hand, there were reasons that Baruch seemed, to some, less 
than ideal. Baruch was a native conservative and was not the best choice for a 
position as idealistic and visionary as the international control of the atomic energy 
required. The advisers he chose seemed like poor choices for the Acheson-Lilienthal 
Plan. Furthermore, the fact that General Groves was chosen as one of the key 
consultants for the Baruch team created suspicions about Baruch's commitment to 
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international control. Acheson expressed his concerns regarding this appointment in 
his diary,  
When I read this news last night, I was quite sick. ... We need a man 
who is young, vigorous, not vain, and who the Russians would feel 
isn't out simply to put them in a hole, not really caring about 
international cooperation. Baruch has none of these qualifications.119 
 
Thus Acheson was anxious about Baruch’s role, not only because of 
Baruch’s age and political past, but also because he doubted Baruch's sincerity. It is 
ironic that what bothered Acheson about Baruch was actually what made Baruch the 
best option for that specific task at that specific time. Acheson’s enumeration of his 
objections to Baruch's appointment, could also be read as an explanation as to why 
he was chosen as the face of the international control of the atomic weapons. He was 
not someone unheard of; he was a man who had proved himself in different areas of 
American life and gained the respect of many, though Acheson did not approve of 
the means by which Baruch had secured such prestige: 
Mr. Baruch was undoubtedly a moneymaker through shrewd stock 
market speculations, as he himself has claimed. He made equally 
shrewd political use of his fortune, rarely squandering it on large party 
contributions, but dispensing it judiciously –and often non-partisanly 
–in small individual contributions to senatorial and congressional 
primary or election campaigns. This practice multiplied his admirers 
in the Congress while his gifted friend, Herbert Bayard Swope, 
polished his public “image.” My plea was useless. Mr. Byrnes, like his 
successor, General Marshall, had fallen victim to Mr. Baruch's 
spell.120 
 
Three weeks after his appointment, the Truman administration and Baruch 
encountered their first clash. Baruch's overconfidence displeased Truman when he 
sent the president a letter putting himself in the position of a policy maker: “I have 
no doubt that the public feels that I am going to have an important relation to the 
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determination of our atomic energy policy.”121 Truman was unsettled by this self-
attested position: “Baruch is the only man to my knowledge who has built a 
reputation on a self assumed unofficial status as “adviser”. I had asked him to help 
his government in a capacity of my choosing. I had no intention of having him tell 
me what his job should be.”122 However, as mentioned before, Baruch was needed in 
the government as a public figure both to appeal the politicians and the dissidents of 
the international control. Consequently, when in the same letter Baruch threatened to 
resign upon learning about a leak of the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan, Truman and 
Byrnes had to reassure him about his position.  
Baruch was annoyed with this leak mainly because he had objections to the 
report and this leak might have tied his hands if it was perceived as the official 
policy. Baruch stated his concerns about the plan as follows: “Even the superficial 
and incomplete examination of the subject that I have been able to make in the last 
few days convinces me that this report is likely to be the subject of considerable and 
rather violent differences of opinion.”123 Therefore, Baruch was afraid of becoming 
only a “messenger boy” for this plan. He wanted an assurance from the 
administration guaranteeing that he was not bound by the plan. When Baruch asked 
the president who would be responsible for drafting the plan that was going to be 
presented to the UN, the president answered, “Hell, you are!”124 Not satisfied with 
Truman's response, Baruch approached Byrnes in April for a more official response. 
Byrnes told him that the President and the Secretary of State would still be 
responsible for the foreign policy making, but they would seek the advice of Baruch 
on the international control of the atomic bomb. Accordingly, even the first few 
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weeks of working with this elderly statesman had been a trial for Truman and 
Byrnes. However, both believed that they needed him to ease the growing opposition 
and both trusted that he was the suitable man for the task and were thereby willing to 
shoulder these difficulties. 
After his confirmation by the Senate, a process which took only two days 
and further emphasized the support he enjoyed in the Republican Senate, Baruch was 
free to put a team together, mainly from old business associates. Banker John M. 
Hancock had worked with Baruch during World War II on industrial mobilization. 
Herbert Bayard Swope was Baruch's assistant during World War I on the War 
Industries Board. Ferdinand Eberstadt was an investment banker and a former aide to 
the Secretary of the Navy, Forrestal. Fred Searls, Jr., who was considered Baruch's 
most important appointment, was a mining engineer and a personal friend. As 
mentioned earlier, these choices created dismay among the supporters of the 
Acheson-Lilienthal Report, mainly because of the lack of scientists on the committee 
and because of the qualifications of the members. Bush referred to the appointees as 
“Wall-Streeters” while Lilienthal saw them as “the old crowd.”125  
Consequently, when Baruch asked the members of the Acheson and 
Lilienthal Committee to stay on as advisers to his delegation, they declined. Acheson 
refused this offer by claiming to have too much work in Washington. But in fact, he 
was afraid that working with Baruch's delegation could be perceived as a 
confirmation of his policies. Further, the Acheson and Lilienthal group was uncertain 
to what extent Baruch was going to alter their plan and therefore opted for remaining 
outside the Baruch team in order that they might be able to raise their concerns 
instead of getting their voices drowned out on the committee. In the end, after 
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Baruch's appointment, the people who had been a part of the policy-making process 
since the fall of 1945 remained distant, creating an important shift in the approach 
taken to international control. The new team also brought a new direction to the 
policy.  
Although years later Baruch accused the scientists of running off and not 
being willing to serve, at the time he was clearly not enthusiastic about cooperating 
with the scientists. He expressed this reluctance in the following comment: “I 
concluded that I would drop the scientists because as I told them, I knew all I wanted 
to know. It went boom and it killed millions of people and I thought it was an ethical 
and political problem and I would proceed on that theory.”126 Baruch did admit to 
wanting Oppenheimer to join his team, but the way he approached the scientist did 
not make it possible for Oppenheimer to work under him. The scientist described to 
Lilienthal the course of the meeting by quoting Baruch's words, “Don't let these 
associates of mine worry you, Hancock is pretty “Right,” but (with a wink) I'll watch 
him. Searls is smart as a whip, but he sees Reds under every bed.”127 But what 
bothered Oppenheimer the most was that Baruch wanted to prepare the American 
people for a refusal from the Russians. For the scientist, the tone of his speech did 
not give any hope to the international control of the atomic bomb. As a result, 
Oppenheimer refused Baruch's offer diplomatically and chose to stay out of the 
decision-making body.128 Therefore, not only the previously-involved politicians, but 
also the scientists, who had been in the center of the atomic energy development 
process since the beginning of the Manhattan Project, refused to work under Baruch. 
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It was not surprising that the Baruch delegation was unsympathetic to the 
Acheson-Lilienthal report. In addition to not having any scientists on his team, 
Baruch was not willing to accept any advice on the issue. He expressed his 
disinterest by turning off his hearing aid when reporters asked him what he thought 
about the Acheson-Lilienthal report. Furthermore, although Baruch and his staff 
received many letters supporting the report, few, if any, were answered. On the other 
hand, the letters that criticized the Undersecretary's plan were received with 
sympathy and responded to immediately. It was in this environment that Baruch 
started to draft the plan to be presented to the UN Atomic energy Commission 
meeting in mid-June. Although no one knew how much he was going to alter the 
plan, by alienating the scientists and the drafters of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, 
Baruch hinted at his stance.129 
The Acheson and Lilienthal group was correct in their suspicions 
concerning the way Baruch would deal with the report. The first confirmation of 
these suspicions came when Baruch admitted to Byrnes that the Acheson-Lilienthal 
Report required extensive amendments. Throughout the month of May, the Baruch 
delegation and the Acheson-Lilienthal group held a series of meetings. During these 
discussions the latter group learned the extent of Baruch's new plan. Lilienthal 
expressed his disapproval stating that, “the gravest danger is that they will put 
forward proposals in a spirit that will ensure their refusal.”130 However, these 
meetings did not prove very fruitful:  
Other proposals by the Baruch group seemed to the consultants to 
weaken their plan by moving away from the concept of international 
authority as the sole performer of dangerous activities toward that of a 
regulation of their performance by others. At the end of two days no 
meeting of minds had occurred.131 
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Because the meeting between these two committees had not ended in 
agreement, the Baruch delegation continued down their own path. In the beginning 
of May, Baruch and Hancock met secretly and decided that they would develop a 
new plan to present at the UN meeting, replacing the Acheson-Lilienthal report. The 
two men also decided that they would not make any concessions on their own plan, 
so as to portray a strong front both in the eyes of the public and the international 
community.132 
The draft of the new plan was presented to the Acheson group in mid-May. 
The Baruch Plan included four fundamental alterations from the Acheson-Lilienthal 
report. The first change was that the new plan called for a total disarmament instead 
of a nuclear disarmament, which would cause uncertainty for the future of the plan. 
As Lilienthal expressed, “this would hopelessly confuse and mix issues, and obscure 
the hope of working out something on the atom bomb.”133 Such a change would 
remove the focus from the atomic bomb and focus instead on the much larger, 
complex and problematical issue of general disarmament. Secondly, the new plan put 
more emphasis on the punishment that would be imposed in case of a violation of the 
conditions. Baruch and his aides were not the first who thought about 
implementation of stricter sanctions, as the Board of Consultants also considered this 
option. However, concluding that it would create an atmosphere of distrust at an 
early stage, the previous group decided that such an action would be fatal for the 
future of the international control.  
The third alteration was related to the previously-proposed International 
Atomic Development Authority. The new plan suggested that private industry would 
be responsible for the mining and refining of fissionable materials which could lead 
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to the creation of a private, not government-run, atomic energy industry. Such a 
potential was desired neither by the American government nor by the international 
community at that time, especially considering President Truman's speech in 
October, which urged the establishment of an atomic energy commission operating 
under the Congress. Hancock was one of the strongest supporters of the change, 
which he saw as a way to hinder the international socialized state. But the most 
controversial of the alterations was the last one, which suggested the abolishment of 
the veto power in the United Nations Security Council. Baruch argued that the veto 
power would enable Russia to abandon the Atomic Development Authority and 
withdraw from the plan.134 Baruch had concluded that the Soviet Union was going to 
withdraw from any commitment it made after it gained sufficient technical 
information about the bomb,135 a conclusion which justified this change.  
As expected, the Acheson and Lilienthal group opposed any changes in the 
previous plan. Acheson objected to the new draft, arguing that the focus on the 
punishment and the removal of the veto power did not contribute to the security of 
the arrangement in the least: 
Swift and sure punishment for violation of the treaty, if realistically 
considered, seemed uncomfortably close to the war, or certainly to 
sanctions that under the United Nations treaty were subject to the veto 
of permanent members of the Security Council. Did it seem likely that 
they would forgo it here? The only practicable safeguard in case of 
violations would be clear notice and warning that they were occurring. 
This would give other parties to the treaty knowledge that it was being 
breached and an opportunity to take such an action, separately to 
collectively, for their own protection as might be possible. Provisions 
for paper police sanctions to be imposed by the same parties were only 
an illusion.136  
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The Undersecretary of State reasoned that if a state decided to violate the 
agreement, this would lead to the collapse of the United Nations and the withdrawal 
of that individual state from the international organization. Therefore, the plan was 
paving the way for failure and did not provide incentive for other nations to stay 
committed. Lilienthal opposed the motivations of Baruch and his aides even more 
than the changes they made. He believed that Searls provided insight as to what his 
true opinions were at a preliminary meeting. Lilienthal explained: 
Searls said that in this we would find out what is going on in Russia. 
And if the Russians refused to accept this proposal, then we would 
know that they would not go along on any international scheme, and 
[...] he didn't finish the statement, but his eyes indicated what he 
thought should then be recommended, and it was anything but 
pleasant.137 
 
What Searls had in mind was not an international control but an atomic 
league of nations when he suggested in the same meeting that, “each nation be 
permitted a stockpile of bombs, as a deterrent against atomic warfare; and that the 
UN also have a stockpile of bombs for retaliation.”138 This perspective was 
completely different than what Stimson and Truman had in mind at the end of 1945. 
They, too, were not willing to sacrifice American national security for the sake of 
nuclear disarmament, but after seeing what the bomb was capable of, for them the 
international control of the atomic weapons far surpassed a nuclear arms race, which 
could create an illusion of national security. 
Baruch, for his part, was not willing to alter the new plan either. Baruch 
may have suspected that, by advocating the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan without being 
willing to make any concessions, the Board of Consultants were seeking to advance 
the previous report by withholding their approval from the Baruch Plan. With his 
team having a completely different mindset about nuclear weapons, Baruch naturally 
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was suspicious of the way the Board reacted to the new draft. The criticisms were 
coming from a group which was not willing to work under him, a disconnection 
made Baruch and his aides hold their ground even more strongly. 
The reaction of the military should also be taken into account at this point. 
After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, other than General Leslie Groves, top ranking 
soldiers of the time did not show any willingness to be involved in the future of the 
atomic bomb. After numerous discussions about whether the civilian authorities or 
the soldiers should be in charge of the nuclear weapons, Truman supported the 
civilian administration, and thus it may be that the soldiers were wary of being 
heavily involved in politics. Furthermore, the members of the Truman administration 
and the Acheson group hesitated to involve soldiers in this matter.  
Baruch, on the other hand, desired the advice of the chiefs of staff and, in 
April, approached the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asking their opinion about the 
international control of the atomic weapons. The chiefs did not respond to Baruch 
with an opinion on the issue. Thereupon, Searls went to communicate with the 
members of Military Staff Committee, which was the military wing of the US 
representation in the UN. At this meeting, Searls learned that the members of the 
committee never discussed the future of the bomb. The approach of Baruch and 
Searls was also quite surprising to the military as they seemed to be seeking 
affirmation of, rather than advice about, the new plan. However, although the 
military men, such as Dwight Eisenhower, Chester Nimitz, Carl Spaatz and William 
Leahy, did not give an official respond to Baruch, they expressed their view on the 
issue through personal correspondence. They argued that “the atomic monopoly put 
America in a preeminent bargaining position with regard to the Soviet Union, and 
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that much advantage should be exploited in the UN.”139 They saw the bomb as a tool 
to be used diplomatically in times to attain the peace America desired: “Our 
monopoly of the bomb, even though it is transitory, may well prove to be a factor in 
our efforts to achieve first a stabilized condition and eventually a lasting peace.”140  
Thus, although Baruch did not receive any official military endorsement for 
his plan in these personal conversations, he perceived that the military was not 
willing to yield to nuclear disarmament and wanted to retain American nuclear 
monopoly. The military had been opposed to any form of nuclear disarmament since 
the efforts on the issue commenced. They retained their anti-communist and anti-
Russian stance, which overruled any form of cooperation during this period. 
Although they chose to remain silent because of their reluctance to oppose the 
executive branch, this silence did not mean approval. Therefore, when Baruch sought 
their concurrence for his plan, the chiefs of staff did not accommodate him, not 
wishing to endorse any policy other than the one approved by the president. 
Nevertheless Baruch considered his plan closer to the military line than the Acheson-
Lilienthal report; he failed to see that the chiefs were not going to affirm an 
unofficial draft favoring nuclear disarmament. When the official report finally came 
in late July, Baruch then understood that the military would only support his plan 
when it was in line with Acheson-Lilienthal report. It should be noted that the 
military wing waited to get reassurance from the President that their views on the 
future of the weapons did not conflict with the civilian plan. Hence, the Joint Chiefs 
simply aligned themselves with the commander in chief, regardless of the military 
stance on the issue. 
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When Baruch did not receive the support he expected from the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, he turned to General Groves as the main source of military advice. As 
indicated previously, Groves had started to work with the Baruch committee as a 
bridge between the Baruch delegation and the Military Staff Committee. Even 
though Acheson warned Hancock that Groves might not be expressing the opinions 
of the military staff, but rather his own, Groves held sway over many appointments 
within the delegation. For instance, he brought Richard Tolman, who was a physicist 
in the Manhattan Project, to the United Nations meeting, an appointment not favored 
by the scientists. Furthermore, Baruch entrusted Major General Thomas Farrell, who 
was Groves' deputy in the Manhattan Project, with the responsibility of estimating 
when the Russians would build the atomic bomb. His infamous estimation was 
twenty years, which was also Groves' estimation. Edgar Sengier, who was a wartime 
ally of Groves, became the raw materials expert in the delegation, fervently opposing 
the establishment of an international Atomic Development Authority. Sengier 
claimed that the organization would “upset wages, dissatisfy people and have 
tremendous difficulties of operation on account of the different nationals 
involved.”141 In this manner, Baruch was able to include some unofficial military 
influence into his team and his plan, adding to his base of allies and strengthening his 
plan’s position.142 
With all the influence he had in the Baruch delegation, Groves also made 
sure that the word “prompt” was replaced by the word “immediate” in case of 
violations of the plan, thus making it highly probable that violators would be 
punished with nuclear attack. Acheson and his advisers were strongly against this 
wording because of its hostile tone: “After careful analysis we had concluded that 
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provision for whether “swift and sure,” or “condign” punishment for violation of the 
treaty were almost certain to wreck any possibility of Russian acceptance of one.”143 
Unperturbed by such concerns, Baruch and his aides started to finalize the plan by 
the end of May, leaving intact two of its most important aspects, severe punishments 
for the violators and the abolition of the veto power. With Groves help, by the 
beginning of June, Baruch was certain that he had sufficient support to put these two 
strong provisions in his plan and present it at the United Nations meeting.  
The reception of the Baruch Plan in America also revealed the power and 
popularity of Bernard Baruch himself. Baruch had been chosen by the Truman 
administration because of his previous experience and his popularity as a 
businessman and a statesman. An editorial in The New York Times on June 15, 1946 
indicated how the editors of the paper supported the Baruch delegation:  
Mr. Baruch, surely no fuzzy-minded dreamer, a patriot who has 
served his country devotedly down to what he yesterday called “the 
late afternoon” of his life, saw none [an alternative to the current 
plan]. In speaking for his government he also spoke out of his own 
wisdom.144  
 
The fact that the editors of this paper, who were behind the international 
control of atomic weapons since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, saw the Baruch Plan as 
completely in line with Acheson-Lilienthal Plan demonstrated both the level of 
Baruch’s favorable reputation and his effective rhetoric. Thus, one should not take 
the support of The New York Times as a shift in their stance towards the issue, but as 
an indicator of the success of Baruch within the country, as implied in the passage 
below:  
As far as the use and control of atomic energy is concerned nations 
must cease to exist. Mr. Baruch made it clear that he was not 
proposing government or any unnecessary interference with the 
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economic or political system of any nation. But he demonstrated that 
there must be a world government over split atoms.145 
 
At the same time, another editorial exposed how much the distrust of the 
Russians had increased. When the Russian delegation was not willing to surrender 
the veto power and requested early compromises from the United States, the paper 
replied:  
This position may seem to imply a distrust of human nature – 
particularly of Russian human nature. [...] We will permit their 
[Russian] inspectors to enter upon our territory and draw their own 
conclusions. When we say that humanity is fallible and need police to 
encourage it in its good intentions we include ourselves.146 
 
The view of the paper reflected how many people in America did not 
perceive the shortcomings of the plan. Mr. Baruch had a strong support and even the 
ardent defenders of the international control seemed unable to identify the potential 
faults in his plan.  
The first two weeks of June involved vigorous as Baruch sought to finalize 
his plan while others sought to influence or oppose the method by which this 
finalization was being achieved. When Acheson, Byrnes and Truman wanted to 
amend his plan, Baruch was able to rebuff them. When the State Department 
suggested that Baruch should have a final meeting with the members of the Board of 
Consultants to get scientific and technical advice, Baruch turned down the 
suggestion, complaining that the scientists were “inelastic.”147 The final efforts 
coming from the state department and presidency resulted in another resignation 
threat from Baruch: “I have lost my confidence in my being able to work this out 
with the President and you [Byrnes] satisfactorily.”148 His threat reached its target 
and Byrnes and Truman backed away from requesting any alterations of the Baruch 
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Plan as, at this point, neither was in a place to accept Baruch's resignation. After 
months of correspondence and considerable effort to secure public and congressional 
support, it would be too risky to get rid of Baruch now. Not only would they lose the 
support Baruch brought with him, but they also would risk creating an unstable 
atmosphere in domestic politics, turning the spotlight on Baruch and the 
shortcomings of the Truman administration instead of the United Nations meeting. 
Lilienthal explained this compromise: “As much as Truman disliked Baruch, he had 
to have someone Congress would trust and who could deflect criticism of the 
administration's atomic energy policy.”149 So, Baruch was triumphant. The sole 
alteration he accepted in his plan was that the word “prompt” was reinserted in the 
place of “immediate,” leaving the nature of the punishment vague.  
When the time approached for the United Nations Atomic Energy 
Commission meeting, there were many reservations concerning the Baruch Plan. 
Lilienthal recorded in his diary the day he went to Washington to read Baruch's 
speech:  
When we went over B[aruch]'s draft of the speech (B. wasn't there), it 
consisted of much mediocre oratory, an adoption of our plan in a 
rather confused and badly organized form of statement, some absurd 
stuff about sanctions and penalties. On raw materials they said “tight 
control” was the key to the plan, and then gibbered about “dominion,” 
and would not consider ownership of mines, even balked at ownership 
of primary plants!150 
 
The month of June and the time for the United Nations meeting arrived with 
the prospect of the Baruch Plan. Much had changed since the fall of 1945, when 
Stimson called for international control of atomic weapons. Doubtlessly, the Baruch 
Plan was far removed from what Stimson had had in mind. In fact, the drafter of 
Acheson-Lilienthal Report saw it as an invitation to failure.  
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In the end, Baruch received a promise from President Truman that he would 
support Baruch and his delegation on the issue of abolition of the veto power and the 
punishments. Furthermore, Truman assured him that the former relationship with 
Britain and Canada on the atomic energy would be carried to the United Nations. 
Baruch was able to go to the meeting with the support of the state department and the 
presidency in his pocket, leaving the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan behind. This approval 
of the Baruch Plan was a turning point in the international control of nuclear 
weapons. The ideal of nuclear disarmament was drowned in the midst of Soviet 
foreign policy, the Republican opposition, growing anti-communism, the loss of 
public and congressional support and lastly the Baruch Plan.  
Two possible explanations may account for the actions of the Baruch team 
and clarify their real intentions. First, it may have been that Baruch and his aides 
sincerely believed in the control of atomic weapons. Nevertheless, they failed to see 
that international control was not possible without Soviet support. On the other hand, 
it may have been that they supported American nuclear monopoly and wanted to use 
the atomic weapon as a diplomatic tool against the Russians. However, Stimson, 
Acheson, Oppenheimer, and Truman recognized the indispensability of Soviet 
support amidst their concerns about Soviet actions and intentions in the world and 
about American national security. This recognition prescribed the softer undertone in 
the Acheson-Lilienthal report in an attempt to work with an unpredictable Soviet 
government. The distinct difference in the tones of the two plans explains why the 
Baruch Plan was perceived by many as a path to failure.  
“We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead,” declared 
Bernard Baruch at the beginning of his speech before the UN General Assembly. He 
proceeded to explain the essentials of the Baruch Plan, emphasizing “condign 
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punishment” as comprising the very heart of the American position. The punishment 
was one of the most important changes from the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, since a 
country would be, Baruch explained, “ready to relinquish any winning weapons [...] 
it must have more than words to reassure it.”151 Baruch further clarified that none of 
the countries would possess a veto power over any provisions of the plan. In 
addition, he outlined that one of the first steps of the plan would be an inspection 
undertaken by the international Atomic Development Authority. These preceding 
conditions in particular would make the plan unacceptable for many nations, not only 
the Soviets. First of all, a preliminary raw-materials survey gave absolute authority to 
the agency, diminishing the power of the national governments:  
The Authority should have as one of its earliest purposes to obtain and 
maintain complete and accurate information on world supplies of 
uranium and thorium, and to bring them under its dominion. [...] The 
Authority should exercise complete managerial control of the 
production of fissionable materials in dangerous quantities and must 
own and control the product of these plants.152  
 
Another concern of other governments was the emphasis on the penalties 
and the veto power, which made unilateral decisions possible. Baruch made it clear 
that the issue of punishment lay at the heart of his plan. However, his strong stance 
on the issue of veto power and the violations turned the issue into one which was 
bound to fail instead of developing trust and relying on the commitments of other 
nations. An excerpt of Baruch’s speech identifies this emphasis on the veto power 
issue: 
It would be a deception, to which I am unwilling to lend myself, were 
I not to say to you and to our peoples that the matter of punishment 
lies at the very heart of our present security system. It might as well be 
admitted, here and now, that the subject goes straight to the veto 
power contained in the Charter of the United Nations so far as it 
relates to the field of atomic energy. The Charter permits penalization 
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only by concurrence of each of the five great powers - the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, China, France, and 
the United States.  
I want to make very plain that I am concerned here with the veto 
power only as it affects this particular problem. There must be no veto 
to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or 
use atomic energy for destructive purposes. 153 
 
Furthermore, the Baruch Plan focused on the losses of the American 
government in case of either a success or a failure, as opposed to what the country 
and the world would gain. This understanding led to a defensive and exclusive 
outcome rather than an open and inclusive one which required that the international 
control of the atomic weapons happen under American conditions or not at all. 
Considering the developments of 1946, that such a delegation emerged from 
the surrounding environment should not come as a surprise. A more optimistic 
delegation could not have been expected given the atomic-spy hysteria, the 
Republican opposition and the dealings of the Soviet Union in the Balkans and in the 
Middle East, all of which justified considerable cynicism. The nation and its leaders 
had been moving towards a more pessimistic outlook since the beginning of the year. 
One could argue that this tendency toward negativity and distrust affected the 
drafters of the Baruch Plan. It could also be maintained, however, that this pessimism 
was precisely the atmosphere Baruch and his aides needed to make their plan viable. 
In either case, it was the Baruch plan that was presented to the United Nations 
Atomic Energy Committee, not the Acheson-Lilienthal report. That was the changing 
of the tide.  
Baruch referred to the atomic bomb as “the winning weapon,”154 which 
revealed the way he perceived the bomb. For Baruch, America had a better 
bargaining position because of the atomic monopoly, making him and the American 
                                               
153
 Ibid. 
154
  Ibid. 
82 
 
delegation less eager to pursue the Russians for the international control of the bomb. 
Instead, with or without the Soviet approval, America would leave the meeting as the 
single owner of “the winning weapon.” Even if the Soviets accepted the Baruch Plan 
they still had to yield to the provisions of the plan, which included a complete 
investigation of the uranium and thorium reserves in Soviet Russia. Even after the 
investigation of the Soviet reserves, the agency was to possess the sole authority over 
these plants, compromising Soviet sovereignty in its own lands. Furthermore, 
although Baruch claimed that America was ready to make any concessions to 
achieve disarmament, in the provisions he offered there was nothing that would 
jeopardize American sovereignty or security. Moreover, in case of a violation on the 
Soviet side, nuclear attack was possible. The issue of punishment gave America 
much more room to maneuver as the sole owner of nuclear weapons. Thus, the plan, 
though it was born of the Acheson-Lilienthal report, took the shape of an ultimatum 
by the time it reached the United Nations meeting. Lilienthal recorded his first 
reaction to Baruch's speech in his diary:  
I [...] pointed out that the raw material ambiguity and its importance; 
said as to “sanctions” that this talk of “condign punishment” set 
another and a discredited tone –the outlaw of the weapon business –
and was contradictory to the spirit of our Report, but perhaps wasn't 
fatal.155 
 
There were several reasons why the Baruch Plan failed. As mentioned 
before, the Acheson and Lilienthal group had good reasons for insisting upon the 
punishment and the veto provisions. Even though Baruch and his aides kept the some 
aspects of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, these two provisions made America look 
arrogant and uncompromising. Furthermore, Baruch did not mention any timetables 
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or any deadlines, which made the plan look like an ambiguous set of ideas rather 
than an applicable concrete plan with phases and deadlines.  
Nonetheless, there are indications that the Acheson-Lilienthal plan might 
not have proved any more successful had it been given a chance as it, too, had 
significant weaknesses. This first plan was idealistic and visionary, while the latter 
Baruch plan was realistic and politically applicable. It is true that the board of 
consultants proved the international control feasible on technical grounds. However, 
there were other aspects of the issue. For instance, assuming that the Atomic 
Development Agency would function the way the Acheson group had outlined was 
to deny the political atmosphere of the time. It was still too early for the United 
Nations or any international organization under it to function harmoniously and 
completely free from national interests. At that time, right after the war, the Soviets 
were experiencing an energy shortage. Therefore, placing a significant source of 
energy into the hands of an international organization might have been crippling for 
the Soviets, whether the plan was altered by Baruch or not. For these reasons, the 
cause of the deadlock of the international control cannot be laid solely on the Baruch 
Plan. Despite the fact that the alterations, the wording and the provisions most likely 
made it much easier for the Soviets to oppose the plan, the political and economic 
atmosphere of the post-war era was not a promising one in which to bring about 
nuclear disarmament. 
On June 14, 1946, Baruch ended his speech with a paraphrase from 
Abraham Lincoln: “We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last, best hope of earth. 
The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just - a way which, if followed, the world will 
forever applaud.”156 However, despite the rhetoric, the Russian delegation did not see 
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the American plan as a means of salvation. In a week, the Soviet delegate Andrei 
Gromyko explained the Russian plan proposing an international convention 
prohibiting the possession, production, and use of nuclear weapons. Gromyko stated 
that world peace was impossible “if the discovery of atomic energy is not placed in 
the service of humanity” and that international arrangements should be made 
“forbidding the production and use of atomic weapons based upon the use of atomic 
energy for mass destruction.”157 Nevertheless, the Soviets were not willing to achieve 
this end under the American conditions. The Russians also rejected negotiations 
concerning the abolishment of the veto power. Eventually Gromyko added that the 
Baruch Plan was not acceptable “either as a whole or in their separate parts.” The 
next six months witnessed a debate on the international control of the atomic energy 
with neither side willing make any compromises on their plan. There the matter died. 
The appointment of Bernard Baruch as the United States ambassador to the 
United Nations Atomic Energy Committee was definitely a vital decision for the 
international control of the atomic bomb. As discussed in the previous chapters, the 
year following the end of World War II was dominated by several struggles for the 
Truman administration. These hindrances led the leaders of the administration, 
starting with Truman and Byrnes, to seek a means to make the international control 
more appealing to the Congress and to the public. Keeping these internal dynamics in 
mind, one can conclude that Baruch’s appointment was not a bad political move. 
Although Baruch proved to be a hard man to work with, the president still believed 
that he was the right choice. Nonetheless, what made Baruch the best choice for the 
task was also what made him a man of strong will and determination. With the years 
of experience in politics and business, Baruch did not find it hard to raise the support 
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he needed for his plan. By ignoring the criticism and advice of the men who were 
involved in the process since the creation of the idea of international control, Baruch 
gave a new direction to the course. At the United Nations meeting, he presented a 
plan that brought the issue to a dead end by the conclusion of the year.  
However, the Baruch Plan was not the only reason that the attempts for the 
international control of the atomic weapons failed. The global atmosphere of the time 
and the Soviet post-war economic and political struggles, doubtlessly, played an 
important role in this failure. Moreover, Stalin was aware of the implications of the 
atomic bomb and how much Hiroshima had changed the balance favoring the United 
States. As a result the Soviet premier initiated the project to build the Soviet atomic 
bomb, as he was aware of the power the bomb gave to the American government.158 
For that reason, it is important to differentiate the impact of Baruch in the domestic 
politics and in foreign policy. It is true that Baruch’s appointment alienated many 
who had the ideal of preventing a nuclear arms race in the coming years. This shift 
had more effect on domestic politics than a foreign policy. By threatening the 
President with resignation more than once, he was able to alter the Acheson-
Lilienthal report and still be supported by the executive branch. Since the Truman 
administration could not afford creating an atmosphere of crisis at such a critical time 
and lose the support Baruch brought with him, they complied with the Baruch plan. 
It should also be reiterated that the thought process of the Baruch team was not clear. 
It is true that the Baruch Plan was not technically against the idea of nuclear 
disarmament; however, Baruch and his aides could not perceive the importance of 
Soviet participation and their disadvantageous position even if they believed in the 
international control. Another possibility was that they wanted to retain America's 
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superior position and thus secure America’s position as the leader in the international 
politics. Either way, they created a plan, which was foolproof for the Americans, and 
which the Russians could reject quite easily.  
The president was not driven solely by the changes in American domestic 
politics. Yet, at the same time, the man who had come a long way to make 
international control possible was not immune to the developments in the world and 
in the American society. Certainly, the growing opposition and the increasing Soviet 
involvement in the Middle East and the Eastern Europe affected the way Truman 
conducted American foreign policy. Accordingly, it can be concluded that the 
domestic politics of the first half of 1946 obliged the president to include a public 
figure who was not stained with the ongoing criticism of the administration. After the 
appointment, although he had several objections to Baruch, Truman did not think 
that the plan would be fatally injurious to the goal his administration had pursued 
since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
I am become death, the destroyer of worlds. 
─ The Bhagavad Gita 
 
 
 
The atomic bomb started a new era. There were those who saw this era as 
the age of American power, since it was the only country that possessed nuclear 
technology. On the other hand, there were those who foresaw the danger lying ahead: 
a world wide nuclear arms race. Secretary of War Henry Stimson concluded that 
prolonging the American nuclear monopoly would become a catalyst for the arms 
race, rather than becoming a deterrent. He believed that the United States should take 
the first step towards the international control of atomic weapons. Stimson proposed 
that the United States, Great Britain and Canada approach the Soviet Union to halt 
further bomb construction. The scientists were supportive of Stimson's proposal. 
Robert Oppenheimer argued that the atomic weapons fell under the responsibility of 
the world community and only one government. Furthermore, nuclear scientist Niels 
Bohr defended free access to scientific information and international control. Leo 
Szilard agreed with Bohr, arguing that preventing an arms race through international 
collaboration was possible. Albert Einstein concurred with his colleagues declaring 
that international control was the only escape from a global destructive war. 
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Not everybody was as enthusiastic about the international control. The 
military figures of the time, like General Leslie Groves, for example, were hesitant to 
support any form of information exchange. On the political side, Secretary of State 
Byrnes believed that the atomic bomb would make the diplomacy with the Russians 
easier while Secretary of the Navy, Forrestal, objected to this proposal because of his 
deep mistrust of the Russians. Amidst the ongoing discussions, President Truman 
believed that international control of atomic weapons was so vital that, before 
waiting for the establishment of a functioning United Nations body, he recommended 
the establishment of an Atomic Energy Commission in the United States. Truman's 
decision on this issue revealed that he was not an ardent supporter of nuclear arms 
race as his policies in the latter years suggested. His support of international control 
showed that Truman was willing to give up the American nuclear monopoly to 
prevent global proliferation. The fact that Truman made this decision in the midst of 
congressional and public opposition further proves his earnestness on the issue. 
However, Truman was also subject to the impact of domestic and 
international developments. By the end of 1945, several senators expressed their 
discontent about information exchange; they believed that the Soviets were not close 
to building their own atomic bomb, and that an information exchange would only 
help them to construct the bomb faster, thus shortening the life of the American 
nuclear monopoly. However, Truman disagreed with the senators, including 
Connally and Vandenberg. The President stated that America was not that far ahead 
of the Soviet Union in terms of nuclear science. Therefore, the risk of hastening the 
Soviet bomb construction was small enough to take in order to achieve international 
control. The fact that Truman was willing to take this risk did not mean that he 
trusted the Russians any more than any senator. In fact, his distrust grew increasingly 
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when he witnessed the Soviet actions in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. These 
two issues, namely losing the support of the Senate and the course of Russian foreign 
policy, started to become important factors in Truman's foreign policy making.  
Furthermore, the first months of 1946 witnessed the strengthening of the 
Republican opposition. Following the position of Senator Vandenberg, the 
Republicans strongly criticized Truman's and Byrnes's foreign policy. Nonetheless, 
although the front against the international control was gaining power, Truman still 
formed a committee to frame the American proposal in the upcoming United Nations 
Atomic Energy Commission in June. The committee, which was comprised of 
politicians and scientists who were strong supporters of international control, drafted 
the Acheson-Lilienthal Report as the basis of the American position. In the wake of 
this report, however, Truman was pushed into a corner politically by Republican 
opposition and emerging bipartisan politics. Furthermore, the issues of Iran, Greece 
and the Eastern European countries, along with Kennan's long telegram and 
Churchill's “Iron Curtain” speech led Truman to change the way he saw the Russians 
and their policy making.  
Because of this growing opposition in the Congress and public discontent, 
Truman and Byrnes had to carefully choose the man who would present the 
American proposal in the United Nations meeting. When Byrnes suggested Baruch, 
Truman thought this elderly statesman was the best choice for the task. Baruch was 
experienced in politics and business and had been an adviser to several presidents. 
He was able to attract both public and congressional support. However, Baruch and 
his aides had a different mindset about the international control of the atomic bomb. 
Thus, when this new team started to draft the American proposal, they moved away 
from the Acheson-Lilienthal report. Even though the Board of Consultants expressed 
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their dissatisfaction and disagreement with the new plan, it was the Baruch Plan that 
was presented in June to the UN. Truman and Byrnes also had several objections to 
the way Baruch was drafting the plan; however, both because the fear of losing the 
support Baruch brought with his appointment and the fear of shifting the focus from 
the issue at hand, Truman went ahead with the Baruch Plan.  
The developments discussed in the previous chapters shed light on a unique 
period of time in twentieth century history. Because it was Truman who made the 
decision to drop the bombs and because he was the first president of the period of 
nuclear arms race, he has been depicted as a president who was blinded by an anti-
Soviet mindset. Doubtlessly, Truman was cautious in the way he dealt with the 
Russians, was the case with the previous presidents as well. Nonetheless, looking 
back to this period through the lenses of the Cold War, one might perceive Truman 
simply as an insincere politician. On the contrary, the foreign and domestic policy 
Truman pursued during this ten-month period reveals that he was not inherently a 
Cold Warrior, endorsing nuclear armament and promoting anti-Soviet policies at any 
cost. He sought a way to control further bomb construction in the world including, 
the United States, because he had witnessed its deadly power, power which could be 
used for or against America. Thus, although the dream of international control of the 
atomic weapons was not realized in 1946, or in the following years, Truman stayed 
committed to this ideal despite strong doubts, considerable domestic opposition, and 
troubling Soviet foreign policy.  
After the collapse of the talks concerning the international control of atomic 
weapons, Truman presented what has come to be referred to as the Truman Doctrine. 
The doctrine was designed to contain communism, to prevent its spread and limit its 
sphere of influence. Truman was able to gain the support of the Republican Congress 
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when he proclaimed the doctrine on March 12, 1947, and thus opening the way to aid 
Greece and Turkey, helping to prevent these countries from becoming a part of the 
Soviet sphere. The Truman Doctrine was followed by the Marshall Plan, which was 
approved to rebuild the war-stricken Europe. The second term of Truman's 
presidency was marked by the establishment of NATO in 1949, the creation of 
People's Republic of China and the rise of McCarthyism. Furthermore, the United 
States involvement in Korea and Vietnam took place for the first time during this 
period. Thus, a wartime alliance with the Soviet Union was followed by anti-
communist domestic and foreign policy starting in 1946. 
On the issue of nuclear weapons, those who predicted that it would take 
twenty years for the Soviets to develop nuclear weapons were wrong. The first 
Soviet atomic test took place in August of 1949 and the Russians detonated their first 
hydrogen bomb in August of 1953. The decade of the 1950s witnessed nuclear 
proliferation both in the Untied States and in the Soviet Union. By the 1960s, some 
steps were taken towards limiting the nuclear proliferation. In 1957, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established under the mandate of the United 
Nations to support the peaceful development of nuclear energy and to provide 
safeguards against the misuse of nuclear plants. The Cuban Missile Crisis occurred in 
1962, bringing the United States, the Soviet Union and Cuba on the verge of a 
nuclear war. The crisis showed the fragility of the balance regarding nuclear 
weaponry in the international sphere. A year later, in 1963, the Partial Test Ban 
Treaty banned all nuclear testing expect for underground testing to prevent nuclear 
contamination. In 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed by 188 
states to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. The treaty had three fundamental 
points: non-proliferation, disarmament and the right to peacefully use nuclear 
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technology. In 1996, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which banned all nuclear 
explosions in all environments, was signed by many nations, including the United 
States of America159 and the Russian federation.  
In addition to these multinational treaties, the United States and the Soviet 
Union underwent several bilateral arms control attempts. The Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks (SALT) were comprised of two rounds of bilateral talks between 
the Soviet Union and the United States. The negotiations started in 1969 and resulted 
in the SALT I Treaty, which froze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers 
at the existing level for both countries and put restrictions on the construction of 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The talks for SALT II took place between 
1972 and 1979 as a continuation of SALT I. Another treaty was signed in 1979 
curtailing the manufacture of strategic nuclear weapons. START (Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty) was also another bilateral attempt between the two superpowers 
signed in 1991. Currently, there are five nuclear powers under the NPT: the USA, the 
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France and China. However, India, 
Pakistan and North Korea are also known to possess nuclear weapons while Israel, 
Iran and Saudi Arabia are suspected of possessing nuclear arsenals as well.  
In the year 2007, the topic of nuclear energy and weapons is still a 
controversial issue. After the first attempts of international control of atomic 
weapons failed in 1946, despite many efforts to quell the rise, the number of nuclear 
powers and nuclear weapons increased. Under the shadow of this proliferation, Kofi 
Annan delivered his last speech as the United Nations Secretary General on 
December 31, 2006 at the Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri, a 
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meaningful location, especially in light of nuclear disarmament. When Annan spoke 
about collective responsibility, he looked back to the presidency of Truman:  
My first lesson is that, in today's world, the security of every one of us 
is linked to that of everyone else. That was already true in Truman's 
time. The man who in 1945 gave the order for nuclear weapons to be 
used - for the first, and let us hope the only, time in history - 
understood that security for some could never again be achieved at the 
price of insecurity for others.160  
 
The fact that Truman's presidency was essential in terms of international 
security indicates how important it is to study this period. The ideal of Truman, 
Acheson, Oppenheimer and others has not been realized. The waters, lands and the 
atmosphere are contaminated by nuclear fallout. Following the failure of 
international control, millions of people lived in fear of nuclear attack and mutually 
assured destruction. Children grew up learning where to hide in case of a nuclear 
war. Scientists predicted doomsday and a nuclear winter. The political and daily 
discourse was filled with acronyms such as MIRVs, ICBMs, SLBMs. Although the 
nuclear bombs had only been detonated over one country, they cast their shadow 
over the whole world for more than half a century, a shadow which lingers even 
today.  
Indeed, this issue continues to demand attention today in the area of nuclear 
non-proliferation. One of the biggest issues in the United Nations is nuclear research 
for military purposes. Iran, who was a party to the NPT, is the current country on the 
agenda, having passed up North Korea, because they have developed a uranium 
enrichment program, claiming to be for peaceful purposes. Even though the United 
Nations passed a resolution dictating that Iran halt the enrichment program, it has not 
complied. Iran's neighbor is suffering from the loss of hundreds of thousands of 
lives, because its leader, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, was suspected of building 
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weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, it was this fear of nuclear weapons which 
resulted in American military involvement in Iraq, as President George W. Bush 
verbalized: “If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy or steal an amount of highly 
enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon 
in less than a year.”161 The present day struggles concerning the nuclear weapons 
make the history of this issue more valuable, not only for scholarship but also for the 
politicians, humanitarian agencies and all the actors involved.  
In 2005, Mohamed ElBaradei and the IAEA were announced as joint 
recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize for “their efforts to prevent nuclear energy from 
being used for military purposes and to ensure that nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes is used in the safest possible way."162 The road to permanent peace in the 
world must go through nuclear disarmament. History has proved that the policy of 
deterrence only led to more fear and more nuclear bombs. Even though, in the past 
nuclear war did not occur, the future still holds the possibility, and it may be that it is 
stronger than ever before. That is the reason that ElBaradei's words are to be taken 
into account by every country: 
Everybody has to chip in, I think, and see how we can have a 
functioning system of collective security where we do not continue to 
face the threat of countries trying to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction or particularly nuclear weapons. Right now what we have is 
countries [having nuclear weapons] because of historical incidents. 
They developed them in the ‘50s and ‘60s or [...] that again, that was 
not meant to be the norm in the future. It was suppose to be a temporary 
situation. We need to bite the bullet and see how we can move beyond 
nuclear weapons deterrence, and I think that we have not done that 
yet.163  
 
No, we have not done that yet; neither in 1946 nor in 2007.  
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